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ABSTRACT 
 
Money laundering, an act of illegal cash washing, accounts for two to five percent of 
the world’s gross domestic product.  This alarming amount of illegal financial activity has 
brought national and international laws, regulations on banks, and procedures to deter money 
launderers.  With the rise of cyber banking, digital cash, anonymous stored value cards, and 
advanced personal identifiable information theft, money laundering laws and regulations fail 
to account for the movement of illegal money in the digital world.  
Discussed in this thesis is an overview of the current money laundering techniques 
and regulations. The objectives of this research are twofold; first, to broadly identify 
deficiencies within the banking and regulatory institutions regarding cyberlaundering 
including hypothetical cyberlaundering methods and second, to suggest a specific feasible 
approach to minimize and deter online laundering of illicit revenue through the application of 
COMET: a Central Online AML Merchant Enforcement Tool.  COMET is a central database 
system which makes use of data mining techniques to mitigate a cyberlaundering return 
merchandise scheme.
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CHAPTER 1.  MONEY LAUNDERING OVERVIEW & TECHNIQUES 
Tom Delay, the 24th United States House of Representatives Majority Leader [1] was 
asked to step down in October 2005 for money laundering.  Benazir Bhutto, the former 
Pakistan prime minister was convicted in 2003 for laundering money through Swiss bank 
accounts [2].  Franklin Jurado, an economist from Harvard University was convicted of 
laundering money in the amount of $32 million for the Columbian drug lord Santacruz-
Londono in 1996 [3].  Money laundering is not a new crime – it has been around since 
organized crime in the 1930s, and still plagues today’s financial market.  According to the 
International Monetary Fund, roughly $600 billion is laundered each year [4].  This is 
between 2 and 5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product.  With the rise of a global 
economy and a digital economy, money launderers are finding easier ways to use other 
country’s banking rules and regulations to their advantage. 
1.1  Introduction to Money Laundering 
Money laundering is defined as “the process of concealing the existence, illegal 
source, or application of income derived from criminal activity, and the subsequent 
disguising of the source of that income to make it appear legitimate [5]”.   The primary task 
is deception when looking at the heart of money laundering: deceiving the authorities by 
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making assets appear as if they have been obtained through legal means, with legally-earned 
income, or to be owned by other parties who have no relationship to the true owner. 
The laws of each country that have criminalized money laundering define the activity 
a bit differently.   This is one of the ways money laundering works – by taking advantage of 
the changing rules per country. 
1.1.1  Stages of Money Laundering 
To better carve a definition of money laundering, it is crucial to understand how 
laundering occurs. Money is usually laundered through a series of transactions and it 
typically includes three steps.  To move to the next step in the process, funds need to be 
moved.  Some of the more obscure methods are done through means of cyber-hacking. 
1.1.1.1  Step one: Placement 
During the first phase, the money launderer will place his/her illegal assets into the 
financial system. This is often done by placing funds into circulation through financial 
institutions, casinos, shops, currency exchange and other businesses, both domestic and 
international.  
Some examples of this phase are: 
• Breaking up large amounts of cash into smaller sums and then depositing 
those directly into a bank account. 
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• Shipping cash across borders for deposit in foreign financial institutions, or be 
used to buy high-value goods, such as artwork, and precious metals and 
stones, that can then be resold for payment by check or bank transfer. 
1.1.1.2  Step two: Layering 
The layering step to money laundering involves taking the proceeds and developing 
complex layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail, ownership, and source of 
funds.  This phase can involve transactions such as: 
• Transferring the deposited cash from one account to another 
• Converting deposited cash into monetary instruments (e.g. e-gold on the Internet) 
• Reselling high-value goods and monetary instruments 
• Investing in real estate and legitimate businesses, etc. 
•  Using shell banks, which are typically registered in offshore areas, and wire 
transfers, which will be focused on later in the thesis 
1.1.1.3  Step three: Integration 
The third and final stage in the money laundering process involves placing the 
laundered proceeds back into the economy to create the perception of legitimacy. By the 
integration stage, it has become very difficult to distinguish legal and illegal wealth [40]. The 
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launderer might choose to invest the funds in real estate, luxury assets, business ventures, or 
other means. 
 
Figure 1.  Stages of Money Laundering 
 
1.1.2  Current Money Laundering Zones 
Currently, there are three large money laundering “zones” associated with money 
laundering [5].  Below is a brief discussion of each, though I would like to introduce a new 
money laundering zone, “cyberlaundering”, which will be discussed more in detail in the 
latter portion of my thesis. 
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1.1.2.1  Correspondent Banking 
Correspondent banking is the service by which “one bank provides services to 
another bank to move funds, exchange currencies or carry out a variety of other transactions 
[5]”. In some correspondent relationships, the foreign bank’s local customers are permitted to 
conduct their own transactions, including wire transfers, through the foreign bank’s U.S. 
correspondent account. Those accounts are known as “payable-through accounts.” In other 
situations, a foreign bank’s correspondent account in the U.S. is used by another foreign bank 
to conduct its own transactions, a practice called “nesting [6].” 
With such direct access to the U.S. financial system, once the funds are received in 
the U.S. correspondent account, the foreign bank’s customers or other foreign banks can 
move the money in or out of the U.S. with the correspondent account serving as cover. This 
money laundering “gateway” is termed as correspondent banking. It added that money 
laundering through correspondent banking “is not a new or isolated problem. It is 
longstanding, widespread and ongoing [5].”  
This vulnerability compelled the Wolfsberg Group, an organization of large banks 
founded in 2000 that issue guidelines for private banking, to publish principles on 
correspondent banking in November 2002 [7]. These recommendations include: 
• Due diligence on risk-based accounts 
• Client information needs to be reviews and updated regularly 
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• Institutions should not offer services or products to shell banks  
• An international registry of financial institutions should be created to help aid 
in tracking down money laundering 
1.1.2.2  Private Banking 
In recent years, private banking has been seen as one of the most vulnerable areas of 
financial activity in the money laundering field. It gives financial flexibility to people of high 
net worth that move billions of dollars worldwide, often secretively, and with comparatively 
little control.  
A 1999 report released by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
documented these reasons as to why private banking is susceptible to money laundering [8]: 
• Private banking clients may have political or economic ties 
• There is generally a closer relationship between the banker and the client 
• Private banking is referenced as “secret” culturally 
• Money laundering controls tend to not be enforced to as great of an extent as public 
banks would 
• There is a greater margin of profit in private banking 
One concerning factor that federal regulators have is the way private bankers work.  
Many of them work in large banks and are given salary bonuses for new customers whom 
they attract to the bank. 
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The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) recommends that banks 
evaluate private banking accounts on a "risk-grade basis," determining the level of risk by 
type of business, geographical location and bank product or service extended [9]. It states 
that well formed steps to open an account are “fundamental risk controls for private banking 
relationships.” These procedures, which bank management should follow, should include 
identification of account owners, source of wealth, and identification of “normal and 
expected” transactions. 
In order to assess these risks, the U.S. Anti-Money Laundering/Bank Secrecy Act 
Examination Manual, released jointly in 2005 by the federal banking regulators, states that 
the following factors should be considered [10]: 
• Nature of the customer 
• Purpose and activity of the account, product, or service 
• Relationship between the bank and the client 
• Location and jurisdiction of the client's home or business 
• Public information about the customer that is reasonably available to the bank  
 
In order to verify the financial and legal status of a business, the OCC states that 
banks should require its personnel to identify the primary owners and review articles of 
incorporation, partnership agreements, financial statements and other relevant documents.  
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It warns that customers introduced by a third party financial partnership, such as an 
investment advisor, may require “particular attention.”   Before establishing their own third 
party procedures, banks should confirm that the intermediary “maintains and adheres to 
adequate standards to verify the identity and legitimacy of its customers [10].” 
1.1.2.3  Black Market Peso Exchange 
The U.S. Customs Service and Colombian law enforcement officials arrested 37 
individuals as a result of a 2 1/2 year undercover operation named Operation Wire Cutter in 
2002 [11].   Though this case is not recent, it is worth mentioning – it was monumentally 
described in the 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy as a landmark case that brought 
down several Colombian peso brokers who were believed to have laundered money for 
narcotics cartels. These brokers were engaging in a form of money laundering called the 
Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE).  This method of money laundering is so significant 
that it is considered a money laundering zone. 
The Black Market Peso Exchange method is, generally, a process by which money in 
the U.S. derived from an illegal activity is purchased by Colombian “peso brokers” from 
criminals in other countries and often deposited in U.S. bank accounts that the brokers have 
established. The brokers sell checks and wire transfers drawn on those accounts to legitimate 
businesses, which use them to purchase goods and services in the U.S.  
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For financial institutions to detect and prevent laundering by peso brokers, they must 
be familiar with the common laundering methods used by the brokers. The most common 
scheme involves multiple checking accounts opened at U.S. banks by foreign nationals [12]. 
Banks must also be aware of the increases in the movement of dollars in the corresponding 
accounts of foreign banks.  
1.1.2.4  Cyberlaundering 
As the physical world of money is fading, a new era of money laundering ease is 
evolving.  The first means of laundering electronically was through wire transfers.  Moving 
money through a wire transfer currently provides a limited amount of information regarding 
the parties involved.  This is becoming less common however, and greater details regarding a 
wire transfer are to be recorded.  As the privacy of wire transfers is decreasing and the record 
keeping regulations are increasing, money launderers need to expand their methods.  This 
approach happens through the world of cyberspace. 
As consumerism increases in the cyber world, so does the need for an effective and 
efficient means of financial transactions.  As a result, electronic cash was created as a 
replacement for cash.  Digital or electronic cash refers to “money or scrip which is 
exchanged only electronically [12]”.  Although a great deal of electronic cash is traceable, a 
few institutions still provide a means of offline and online anonymous digital cash.  This type 
of anonymity is of a particular interest to money launders. 
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The issue that arises in cyberlaundering is the deficiency of the regulations specific to 
electronic money laundering.  Many digital banks do not fall under a specific regulatory 
statute, and thereby would not have to adhere to certain rules that brick and mortar banks 
would need to.  Furthermore, there is a great deal of controversy in regards to the privacy 
rights – weather all electronic transactions should be monitored simply because a small 
percentage might be illegal. 
1.2  International Crime Organizations 
Local and national law-enforcement agencies have been limited to combating money 
laundering by the confines of geographic jurisdiction.  As a result, perspective has equally 
been limited and crime has been a local or national issue.  Money laundering, especially in 
the cyber world, has crossed jurisdictional boundaries and has gone global.  Even though the 
advent of money laundering is an international threat, it is important to know the large money 
laundering organizations.  More than 80% [13] of current money laundering is performed 
through a connection to these organizations.  There are three main types of transnational 
organizations.  First, there are the six large [13] transnational criminal organizations: the 
Italian Criminal Enterprises , the Russian Mafiya, the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, 
the Columbian Cartels, and the Mexican Federation.  The second main type of criminal 
organizations is the smaller groups which are very highly organized.  These organizations 
have certain criminal specialties that work for the six large transnational organizations as a 
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smaller entity.  These groups are found in Nigeria, Panama, Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic, and Puerto Rico.  Lastly, there are terrorist groups who deal in smuggling, 
contraband, narcotics, and other items as a means to finance their political objectives.  The 
method of terrorist financing is similar to money laundering, but done differently. 
1.2.1 The Big Six 
The Italian Criminal Enterprises are made up of four distinct criminal groups 
operating primarily in Italy: the Mafia, the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta, and the Sacra Corona 
Unita (Sacred Crown).  These groups are generally organized on family or clans and work on 
a system of power known as the sistema del potere [13].  This system of power has expanded 
beyond Italy and formed alliances with transnational organizations. 
The Russian Mafiya has become the world’s dominant criminal organization.  They 
are known as the rackteers in the U.S. and consist of about 5,000 to 6,000 gangs [14].  Their 
past skills have been slavery, human smuggling, gasoline fraud, toxic waste disposal, and 
telecommunications fraud.  Currently, they are involved more with Internet banking fraud, 
credit card theft, and money laundering over the Internet.   The schemes and speed at which 
they carry out these activities are increasing daily [14]. 
The Japanese Yakuza has been a part of Japan since the early 1600s and is currently a 
large part of legal and illegal economies.   The issue was so bad that the government passed 
the Act for Prevention of Unlawful Activities by boryokudon [13].  Boryokudon or 
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“organized crime” groups were not allowed to make a profit on extortion, gambling, or other 
legitimate or illegitimate activities.  Currently, the Yakuza of Japan deals a great deal with 
the financial sector, using laundered money to perform their activities [15]. 
The Chinese Triads consists of many branches of organizations based in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China.  The Chinese Triads can be found in the U.S. as 
well – particularly in San Francisco.  Their activities include drug trafficking, contract 
murder, money laundering, gambling, prostitution, car theft, extortion, and racketeering [16]. 
A recent scheme that the Triads are performing is shipping goods to non-existent companies 
where the goods are replaced with cash.  They are then marked as undeliverable, and the cash 
is shipped back.  Returned goods are not inspected because they seem to have never been 
delivered.  
The Columbian Drug Cartels are known to have the largest cocaine trafficking.  The 
cocaine comes from Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia.  The Cali Cartel is known for its high 
amount of financial crime over the other two.  The other two are known as the Medellín 
Cartel and the Norte Del Valle Cartel.  The Cali cartel invested its funds into legitimate 
business ventures as well as front companies to mask the influx of money it was obtaining in 
cocaine. In 1996, the Cartel was making 7 billion in annual revenue [41].   The cash needed 
to be laundered.  Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, who was affiliated with the Cartel, was able to 
secure the position of Chairman of the Board, of Banco de Trabajadores. The bank was 
believed to be used to launder funds for the Cali cartel, as well as the Medellín Cartel.  
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Furthermore, Gilberto founded the First InterAmericas Bank operating out of Panama.  
Gilberto admitted to money being laundered through the bank, however, he stated that the 
process was legal. Gilberto later started the Grupo Radial Colombiano, a network of radio 
stations and a pharmaceutical chain which was also used to launder monetary funds. 
The Mexican Federation launders approximately $7 billion annually amounting to 
2.5% of the Mexican economy’s value [13].  Responsible for the cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana production in Mexico, the drug proceeds are placed into the financial system 
through Mexican banks or casas de cambio, or sent back across the border without 
knowledge of the true owner of the funds. 
1.2.2 Other International Criminals 
Nigerian Criminal Organizations are known for many different cybercrimes, and 
laundering money via the Internet is not any different for them.  Their money laundering 
efforts include standard techniques such as smuggling and money-exchange houses but do 
things a bit differently.  The Nigerian criminals will buy heroine from countries, paying for it 
in U.S. dollars.  They then smuggle the heroine to the U.S. and Europe.  After selling the 
drugs, consumer goods are purchased where they are sold in Nigeria on the black market.  In 
order to then convert the proceeds of this into US dollars, the naria (Nigerian Currency) is 
delivered to one of the cities on the Nigerian border.  These are converted in to CFA francs, a 
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currency promoted by France to promote trade.  The receipts of the trade allow them to wire 
the francs to banks in England where they are then converted into U.S. dollars. 
CyberCrime Inc. is an umbrella name for people who are involved with organizing 
criminal activity on the web.  One of their largest crimes is assisting the big six with 
laundering money for them through methods that will be discussed later in the thesis.  The 
biggest issue with these criminals is the speed and determination they have for conducting 
illicit activity on the Internet, whether it is drug trade or cleaning up dirty money.  
1.3  Money Laundering Techniques and Tools 
The following section talks about the more common techniques used by launderers to 
wash dirty money through the banking industry.  Knowing these techniques can better help 
mitigate and understand how money laundering can occur in the cyber world. 
1.3.1 Smuggling 
Since 1986, the structuring method (discussed in section 1.3.2) of money laundering 
became a criminal offense.  As a result, smuggling has been the most popular method for 
starting the money laundering process.  Smugglers are attempting to get the cash away from 
the strict U.S. and into a less monitored country.  The simplest way to wash cash using via 
smuggling is when the money travels over the border, such as from the United States to 
Mexico, the money is not declared on a CMIR report (CMIR reports will be discussed later 
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in the thesis).  The launderer then turns around and declares the funds at U.S. Customs as 
legitimate revenue, backed up with phony receipts from Mexico.  Then the cash can be 
placed in any U.S. bank without any suspicion, and wired to a location of choosing.  The 
DEA and Customs estimates that roughly $50 billion is smuggled out of the U.S. every year, 
thus avoiding many of the money laundering reports and regulations.  This is only the 
amount seized however – there could be much more. 
Smuggling cash out of the United States is the method of choice for many money 
launderers because the primary goal of the U.S. Customs Service is inbound drug monitoring 
more than outbound drug monitoring.  Smuggling drugs into the U.S. is only one of three 
types of smuggling used in the laundering cycle.  Outbound cash smuggling and inbound 
financial instrument smuggling are the other two.  For example, a study in 1994 found that 85 
out of 338 ports controlled by Customs had been performing outbound inspections [13].  
There are 5,000 trucks that cross into the U.S. daily on average with only about 200 of those 
inspected (This statistic was conducted before September 11th, 2001.  Inspections have 
increased since). 
Smuggling cash is done by three different methods.  Cash is shipped in bulk through 
the same channels that were used to bring in the narcotics.  Another way is hand carrying the 
cash.  Lastly, the cash can be converted into a monetary instrument such as a money order or 
a traveler’s check and then mailing these to foreign banks. 
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1.3.2 Structuring 
The term structuring describes the act of dividing large sums into smaller sums less 
than $10,000 each to avoid the Bank Secrecy Act Reporting requirement (discussed later in 
the thesis).  Since 1986, this method has been listed as a crime through the banking industry.  
It is widely used in the cyber laundering realm as the law only applies to financial 
institutions.  Many launderers are structuring in a method known as “smurfing” where the 
each deposit is not made by the same individual but rather this individual is hiring others to 
deposit the money in accounts in an attempt to remain anonymous.  One offline case of this 
was the Grandma Mafia Case where a 60 year old grandmother led a group of women in 
depositing $25 million in various bank accounts in California. 
1.3.3 Front Companies 
Front Companies are a place where launderers can place and layer proceeds that are 
illegal.  A metals company called Cirex International was used by a Colombian drug lord to 
deposit approximately $150 million into various U.S. bank accounts [13].  Front companies 
do not need to comply with any financial institution to operate.  They are also difficult to 
detect if there is legitimate business being conducted and if the institution is not required to 
fill out CTRs (discussed later in the thesis). 
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1.3.4 Shell Corporations 
Shell companies are, according to the FATF, “institutions, corporations, foundations, 
trusts, etc., that do not conduct any commercial or manufacturing business or any other form 
of commercial operation in the country where their registered office is located. [42]” These 
companies assist with the layering step of money laundering and are not complex to set up.  
Any lawyer will register a business for a fee and name him or herself the 
chairman/chairwoman.  Corporate bank accounts are created at various offshore or island 
banks.  The organizations are used when clients need to launder money and remain 
anonymous. 
1.3.5 Dollar Discounting 
Dollar discounting is where a drug dealer will auction his drug proceeds to a broker at 
a discount.  Then the broker is assuming responsibility for laundering the money.  This is 
done so that the money can be given to the drug dealer quickly in order to better prevent 
himself from being discovered by law enforcement.  
1.3.6 Mirror-Image Trading 
The mirror image trading scheme works in where a launderer buys contracts for one 
account while selling the same amount from another account.  Because both accounts are 
controlled by the same person, there is neither profit nor loss – just new money. 
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1.3.7 Inflated Prices 
This scheme works where false invoices are created for imported good that were 
never purchased or bought at high inflated prices.  It is estimated that this false evaluation of 
the price of goods that come from overseas has cost the U.S. approximately $30 billion in 
taxes that are not accounted for per year [13]. 
1.4  Money Laundering in the Banking Industry 
About 30 years ago, it was very easy for a drug dealer or a criminal to walk into a 
United States bank and deposit large amounts of money.  Through the aggressiveness of 
Bank Secrecy Act regulations and the US Patriot act, the US banks are not as strong of a field 
for money laundering.  It has become exceedingly difficult for money laundering to occur 
within the realms of U.S. banks.   In this section, a quick overview of the banking industry 
will be introduced along with common money laundering techniques.  This framework will 
help with understanding the banking laws and statues so that preventative cyber laundering 
measures can be discussed. 
1.4.1 The United States Banking Industry 
The banking industry in the United States is complex, consisting of financial 
industries at the federal, state, and local level.  All these are regulated by federal and state 
agencies that at times regulate the same things.  The primary banking system is the Federal 
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Reserve, which is run by a board of seven governors appointed by the U.S. president for 14 
years.  The Federal Reserve has 12 central banks, a Federal Advisory Council, and member 
banks.  All banks of national status are members of the Federal Reserve Banking System.  
They are supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and must contain the word 
“National” in their name.  If they meet these qualifications, then they can become a member 
of the system. 
1.4.2 Offshore Banks 
An offshore bank is a bank located outside the country where the depositor of 
financial currency resides.  These “offshore banks” are generally in a low tax jurisdiction that 
provides financial and legal advantages.  Besides the advantage of greater privacy that an 
offshore bank provides, there are many other reasons why a money launderer would look to 
an offshore bank.  Some of these include: 
• No mandatory reporting of suspicious activity 
• The government in where the offshore bank is located is corrupt 
• American dollars can be used in an offshore bank (possibly) 
• Ability to use anonymous, nominee, or numbered accounts 
• No effective monitoring of currency movements 
• Access to free-trade zones 
• Bank regulatory systems in many offshore banks do not perform well 
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The term “offshore” originates from the banking industry in the United Kingdom 
where the term “offshore” was where banks in the Channel Islands were.  Offshore banks are 
more commonly used to represent many of the banks on small islands and even many of the 
stable, private banking done in Switzerland. 
1.4.3 Common Money Laundering in Banks 
This section will briefly discuss some of the common money laundering techniques 
that have been used in the banking industry.  Through the Bank Secrecy Act and other Anti-
Money Regulations, these have been mitigated extensively.  It is helpful to better understand 
these methods in order to mitigate methods for cyberlaundering. 
1.4.3.1  Wire Transfers 
Wire transfers are simply transferring money from one bank or institution to another.  
Wire transfers are and will be imperative for the banking industry.  This method of 
“layering” illicit funds is the most common tool in the banking industry for moving large 
amounts of capital.  There are three main transfer systems used in the world for wire 
transfers.  One is called CHIPS (The Clearing House Interbank Payment System), another is 
known as Fedwire, and the international wire system is known as SWIFT (Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).  There are approximately 700,000 wire 
transfers daily moving over $2 Trillion U.S. dollars [43].  A wire transfer works in this 
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manner.  A bank sends a message to a transfer system's main computer indicating the 
originating bank, the amount, the receiving bank, and the specific person who is to receive 
payment.  The computer adjusts the balances, and produces an electronic debit ticket at the 
original bank along with a credit ticket at the receiving bank.  Once the bank receives a credit 
ticket, it lets the originating bank know to debit the money.  If the two banks are part of the 
same wire transfer system, they are the only two banks in the chain.  If they are not, such as 
in an international transfer, then transfers have to be done through a correspondent account.  
80% of the transactions are not done this way however [13]. 
The Annunzio-Wylie act of 1994 regulated wire transfers in the following manner. 
The originating bank accepts a payment order and begins a wire transfer. It must verify and 
retain records of the identity of the individual submitting the payment order.  If there is no 
information given, the bank still processes the order, but must make a note that there was no 
information provided.  At the same time, the bank obtaining the transfer needs to maintain 
records of the recipient.  Any banking system that is forwarding on the information does not 
need to verify records.  The record-keeping and verification requirements apply to funds that 
are $3,000 and greater. 
1.4.3.2  Money Laundering Prevention 
Banks take a very strong approach in mitigating risk and preventing money 
laundering from occurring in their institution.  Since the inception of the Bank Secrecy Act in 
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1970, other rules and regulations followed in order to cork any holes that came about from 
the rising technology and change in the banking system.  As a response to the September 11th 
Attacks, the US Patriot Act clamped down on terrorist financing by extending the rules 
already in place.  The one stipulation however is the need to prevent money laundering from 
occurring electronically. 
All banks are required to have a BSA compliance program.  These programs must set 
out a system of internal controls, designate a BSA security officer, undergo auditing, and 
train bank personnel.  Furthermore, banks must institute a “Know Your Customer” policy in 
order to verify that the customer is not on any list of known fraudsters, terrorists or money 
launderers, such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals list 
[44].  Other than this, the policy monitors transactions of a customer against their banking 
history and banking of their peers. 
1.5  Money Laundering in Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
The Bank Secrecy Act originally applied only to 20 “financial institutions”, and was 
later extended to apply to all national banks.  Five of these were banks, where the other 15 
were known as non-bank financial institutions and included the following: 
• SEC registered and other securities or brokers/dealers 
• currency exchanges 
• investment banks 
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• traveler’s check and money order issuers 
• redeemers 
• credit card systems 
• insurance companies 
• travel agencies 
• precious metal dealers 
• pawn brokers 
• finance companies 
• real estate brokers 
• financers 
• the U.S. postal service 
• casinos 
 
Non-bank financial institutions listed are subject to the BSA reporting requirements, 
but generally need to only license within the state.  The known money laundering cases in 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions are the casas de cambio, major wire companies, the wire 
transfer “Giro houses [37]” or neighborhood money transmitters and insurance companies.
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CHAPTER 2.  MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTES & LAWS 
Money Laundering is an international issue.  As with many laws and statues, the 
regulations to handle money laundering activity are addressed slightly differently by each 
nation.  The United States has, in recent years, looked at anti money laundering regulations 
as a means to prevent terrorist financing due to the attacks of the World Trade Center in 
2001.  The U.S. will be discussed first.  In order to discuss techniques mitigating 
cyberlaundering, a discussion of regulations in effect in other international communities will 
be addressed. 
2.1  U.S. Rules and Statues 
The U.S. Began regulating money laundering in 1970 by passing three statues.  First 
was the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970.  This act served as the foundation of bank 
reporting activities.  The main purpose of the act was to create a paper trail of any activity 
deemed “suspicious” for law enforcement to follow [46].  Section 5311 of the Bank Secrecy 
Act states that its purpose is “to require certain reports or records where they have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings [47]”.  This 
report is an IRS form 4789, more currently known as a Currency Transaction Report (CTR).  
Whenever an individual or someone conducting a transaction on behalf of an individual that 
involves $10,000 or aggregations that add up to $10,000 in one day, a CTR must be filed by 
the bank.  These records must be retained for five years minimum.  Banks with more than $1 
billion in assets are examined biannually; others are done randomly to make sure that the law 
is being upheld. 
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Another major part of the BSA is the requirement for banks to fill out Currency and 
Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIRs) and Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs).  
CMIRs are similar to CTRs but record any coins, foreign currency, securities, traveler's 
checks, bearer bonds, and negotiable instruments deposited which have value greater than 
$10,000 [48].  FBARs are forms that deal with the deposit of $10,000 USD into a foreign 
bank [48]. 
In 1982, the BSA was modified to include other financial institution's necessity to file 
CTRs such as travel and insurance agencies, money exchanges, auto dealerships, and wire 
transfers.  In 1984 the BSA again amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.  This 
act amended section 5323 of the Bank Secrecy Act that provided awards for people who 
could provide information into cases of money laundering where the government was able to 
recover more than $50,000. 
In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act came into power.  This addressed the 
issues that launderers were performing to skirt the reporting requirements.  Launderers would 
use casinos, use front companies, and simply smuggle money.  The method most commonly 
used by money launderers was to structure the transactions by dividing the deposits into 
amounts that were less than $10,000.  As discussed briefly earlier in the thesis, this is known 
as “smurfing”.  Smurfing is a term derived from the blue smurfs where there were many 
small entities (many small smurfs) [49].  The Money Laundering Control Act addressed these 
issues by requiring CTRs be filled out if small deposits amounted to $10,000 in a day.  
Furthermore, casinos were required to adhere to the BSA. 
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In addition, the BSA provides civil money penalties for noncompliance [46].  The 
first case where this took place was against The Bank of Boston.  The bank failed to file 
CTRs for 1,163 transactions valued at $1.2 billion.  Other banks followed suit: Croker 
National Bank paid a fine of $2.25 million for not filling CTRs, the Republic Bank of Miami 
was fined $1.95 million. 
In 1990, a group called “FinCEN” was formed.  FinCEN, or The Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, is a bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury that 
collects and analyzes information about financial transactions in order to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 strengthened BSA 
violation sanctions along with requiring Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).  SARs are 
similar to CTRs with the exception that SARs allowed banks and other institutions to report 
suspicious activity other than a deposit of $10,000.  Furthermore, the verification and 
recordkeeping for wire transfers were put into place, and the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory 
Group (BSAAG) was established. 
    In 1994, the Money Laundering Suppression Act was established.  This required 
banking agencies to review and enhance training, and develop anti-money laundering 
procedures.  The Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act in 1998 created the 
High Intensity Money Laundering and Related Financial Crime Area (HIFCA) Task Forces 
to concentrate law enforcement efforts at the federal, state and local levels in zones where 
money laundering is a problem. 
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The most interesting change to Anti-Money Regulations seemed to occur in a matter 
of weeks after the September 11th terrorist attack on the world trade center.  The rules and 
regulations in anti-money laundering were for the most part domestic, but because of the 
attack, the regulations that were to be enforced had a global outlook.  The Bank Secrecy Act 
originally did not include laws that were targeted to prevent terrorist financing by way of 
money laundering.  This was done by the passing of the US Patriot Act in 2001.  The act 
included provisions on counterfeiting, information gathering and sharing, victims, and 
bribery of a public official.  This law also made laundering money through a foreign bank a 
criminal offence.   
Some other provisions the act included were: 
• Prohibiting the U.S. from maintaining accounts for foreign shell accounts. 
• Allowing the U.S. to obtain and hold the proceeds of foreign money 
laundering cases that occurred in the U.S. 
• Creating new offenses of the concealment of terrorists. 
• Encourage cooperation amongst banks, law enforcement, and regulators to 
discourage and prevent money laundering.  This included sharing information 
about individuals engaged in suspicious activity. 
• Including certain compute fraud crimes associated with money laundering, 
export control violations, firearms offenses, and foreign corruption offenses. 
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Figure 2.  Timeline of AML Acts and Statue
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Furthermore, the act covers certain aspects of record keeping.  The US financial 
institution must now maintain additional records for any bank.  The US financial institution 
must maintain additional records for any correspondent bank account it holds for a foreign 
bank.  These records must include details of the owner(s) of the foreign financial institution 
and the name and address of a US resident authorized by the foreign bank to accept service 
of legal process for records regarding the correspondent account.  According to the law, this 
information must be provided to the US authorities within seven days.   Furthermore, the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the Attorney General may issue a summons of a subpoena to any 
foreign financial institution that maintains a correspondent account in the US, and request 
any records relating to an account.  If a foreign financial institution fails to comply with the 
subpoena, the Secretary of the Treasury or the attorney general can issue a written notice to 
the US financial institution ordering it to terminate the correspondent banking relationship 
within ten days.  
2.2  International Regulation Development 
Due to the increase of money laundering at the international level, trans-national 
organizations have been formed to address this issue.  Many countries are very open to the 
idea, and those that are not are discovering that their economic development is negatively 
affected due to a lack of cooperation. Many countries prohibit working with countries whose 
rules and regulations towards combating money laundering are considered inadequate.  A list 
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of countries that do not cooperate with international money laundering strategies is issued by 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an international organization formed to prevent 
global money laundering.  The FATF is an independent international body established in 
1989.  Its main purpose “is the development and promotion of policies, both at national and 
international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing [28]”.  
Four tools have been established as requirements for effective action against money 
laundering:  
• The criminal justice system within a country must be able to enforce the 
tracing, halting, and acquisition of the money involved in criminal activity. 
• Enactment and implementation of legislation to criminalize and prevent 
money laundering must be present 
• Due to the international drug trade and money laundering schemes, there must 
be an enhanced level of international cooperation to assist with the capturing 
of money launderers 
• Legislation and regulations need to be put in place to assist with the criminal 
justice system 
 
When discussing the international action against money laundering, specific 
mechanisms existed for the prevention and control of the crime.  One of the first groups to 
get involved was the European Union (EU).  The EU issued three orders on the Prevention of 
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the money laundering through the financial system.  The first order was established in 1991 
and required all member states to change their national laws to be able to prevent their banks 
from a money laundering exploitation.  The second order came about from the limitations of 
the first order and was established in 2001 [50].  Within this order existed two major 
proposals.  The first was to enhance the control of drug trafficking and other crime, including 
tax evasion.  The second proposal was to bring terms to the non-financial sector. This 
brought various objections from different groups, but eventually settled with the following 
bodies involved in the order: 
• Estate agents 
• External accountants, auditors, and tax advisors 
• Auctioneers where payment were in cash and for amounts of  €15,000 and 
over 
• Dealers in high-value, such as precious stones or metals, or works of art 
• Independent legal professions specializing in specific functions 
 
The third order was adopted by the EU in 2007.  This order contained more details in 
regards to due diligence for customers with regards to three cases:   
• Where there is no face-to-face contact with the customer 
• Banking relationships overseas 
• Relationships with people of political power 
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Furthermore, the order did not include a specific industry but stated “other natural or 
legal persons trading in goods, only to the extent that payments are made in cash in an 
amount of €15,000 or more, whether the transaction is executed in a single operation or in 
several operations which appear to be linked [29]” 
In 1988, the United Nations held a conference for the Adoption of a Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances [51].  Four obligations 
for parties participating in the Convention were created: 
• Money laundering became a criminal offense 
• Measures for the proceeds of drug trafficking were created 
• Measures to permit international assistance in order to combat money 
laundering 
• Ability for courts to order that financial records be available to law 
enforcement disregarding bank secrecy laws. 
 
In 2002, the Palermo Convention was ordered by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations who adopted the United Nations Convention against Trans-national Organized 
Crime [52].  The convention was legally bound by the UN and created a treaty, which was 
signed by 184 countries.  The treaty established laws against obstruction of justice, 
corruption, money laundering, and participation in organized crime.  Furthermore, the 
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convention assisted countries on issues such as mutual legal assistance, extradition, transfer 
of proceedings, and joint investigations [52]. 
In 1974, a committee by the name of the Basel Committee was established.  This 
committee was made up of the central banks from ten different countries: Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK and the USA.  The committee set forth as statement of principles, titled the “Basel 
Principles” and has proved over the years a large step forward in the prevention of money 
laundering.  In 2001, the committee issued customer due diligence for financial institutions 
addressing customer verification standards called “Know Your Customer” (KYC) which was 
later revised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  The Basel Committee formed The 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) to help define and implement international 
standards for cross-border banking. 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in 1999 to bring together senior 
officials from banks and supervisory committees in order to reform many of the auditing 
issues in offshore centers [53].  Many of the wealthier offshore financial centers had a better 
compliance then those of lower income.  An assessment program was put into place to insure 
compliance from all offshore financial centers. 
In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank began a one 
year program to assess the international money laundering standards conducted with the 
FATF and OGBS [54].  Following the program, the World Bank and IMF responded to over 
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100 countries who were asking for help in building a program to help fight money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  The assistance focused on how countries could up their regulations to 
standards found in the international realm as well as improving coordination between 
governmental departments.  
In the late 1990s, the international scene became concerned that private banks were 
not involved enough with combating money laundering.  As a result, a group called the 
Wolfsberg Group which consisted of 12 global banks produced and published Anti-Money 
Laundering Principles for Private Banks.  In 2002, the Wolfsberg Group produced a 
statement on the financing of terrorism and in 2003 a statement on monitoring, screening, 
and searching.  These principals are voluntary but there are very strong reasons for 
institutions involved with private banking to adhere to the principles. 
The Egmont Group created a meeting of the Financial Investigation Units (FIUs) of 
many FATF countries in 1995 in order to improve and increase communication between the 
parties.  According to the group an FIU is “a central national agency responsible for 
receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities disclosures of financial 
information concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or required by national legislation or 
regulation in order to combat money laundering [55]”.  Furthermore, the group founded a 
Memorandum of Understanding which information could be shared more easily between the 
FIUs. 
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These groups and summits have been pinnacle in the mitigation of money laundering.  
However, the main international force has become the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
and its forty recommendations which have been the cornerstone for most national anti-money 
laundering laws throughout the globe [13].  When the attack on the World Trade Center 
occurred, the FATF issued an additional Nine Special Recommendations to prevent terrorist 
financing.  
To become a member of FATF, the minimum criterion needs to be followed: 
• Commitment to prevent money laundering at the political level 
• All Recommendations must be implemented within three years 
• Annual self-assessment exercises and two rounds of mutual evaluations must 
be administered 
• Must be an active participant in the regional FATF body 
• Must be a country that is strategically important 
• Money laundering and drug trafficking must be a criminal offence in your 
country 
• Financial institutions must identify their customers and be able to report 
suspicious transactions 
 
The FATF fulfills other roles, including assisting those countries who are a part of 
FATF to implement anti-money laundering guidelines, follow case studies, and promote anti-
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money laundering measures.  The Forty Recommendations published by FATF are targeted 
towards governments and financial institutions forming a comprehensive statement against 
money laundering at the global level.  In 2000, the FATF drew up criteria to create a list of 
Countries that did not follow FATF’s Forty Recommendations.  In 2000, the list was at 23 
countries, and currently has only two – Myanmar and Nigeria. 
FATF has been a driving force in combating global money laundering, identifying 
many of the trends and methods associated with money laundering.  As the world enters an 
age where the use of computer technology begins to aide in transferring money globally, the 
FATF will need to be responsive and adjust its combat in the world of money laundering.  
2.3  U.S. Bank Regulatory Forms 
The Bank Secrecy Act outlines five major reports and an IRS form (8300) that banks 
are required to file in the U.S.  In addition to these reports, banks must maintain certain 
records as well – this section will briefly cover the six reporting forms in order to explain 
what information is being reported to FinCEN.  
2.3.1 Currency Transaction Report (CTR) 
Since the beginning of the Bank Secrecy Act till 1992, the CTR was the primary form 
to evaluate and determine if money laundering was an issue in a financial institution.  The 
filing of this form was required if transactions of an individual would amount to $10,000 or 
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more in a given day.  Since 1992, the CTRs have been enhanced by Suspicious Activity 
Reports (discussed in section 2.3.6).  The reason why CTRs are not the only form of 
compliance: the IRS estimates that 30 to 40% of CTR filings are simply routine legitimate 
deposits.  Furthermore, each CTR is costing approximately $3 to $15 to report totaling $130 
million per year.  For federal agencies, the cost to report and process the data is 
approximately $2 per CTR.  Banks are also heavily fined for insufficiently filing CTRs.  
2.3.2 Currency Transaction Reports by Casinos (CTRC) 
Since 1985, casinos with revenue greater than $1 million must fill out CTRCs.  
During 1996, casinos filed 150,000 CTRCs which totaled approximately $3.2 billion.  In 
1997 these forms were simplified by the Treasury Department to state that every deposit, 
withdrawal, exchange of currency or tokens/gambling chips that involve $10,000 or more 
must be included.  
2.3.3 Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR) 
The Currency and Monetary Instrument Report, or also known as the “Report of 
International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments” was created by the BSA 
in 1970 [46].  This form required any person who transports inventory greater than $10,000 
in or out of the U.S. to declare this on a CMIR.  This is different than a CTR in where a CTR 
is the responsibility of a bank and a CMIR is on the responsibility of an individual. 
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The most interesting case involving a CMIR happened in 1988 with Raoul Arvizo-
Morales, who at the time was employed by a money exchange in Juarez, Mexico.  He was 
asked by his brother, who was the owner of a money exchange business at that time to 
transport $172,081.04 in checks and cash to the Texas Commerce Bank in El Paso, TX.  A 
CMIR was filled out for that transaction.  Just before he was about to leave, his brother asked 
Raoul to stuff a little over $20,000 into a brown paper bag, which he did not claim.  At the 
border crossing, the CMIR was given to the customs officer who asked to see the money.  
Raoul produced two paper bags with money in them.  When the customs officer asked if all 
the money was going to the Texas Commerce Bank, he said yes except for one of the paper 
bags.  Arvizo-Morales asked if he could add the contents to the CMIR form as it was a 
mistake.  The officer declined and seized all of his money.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit allowed the entire sum to be forfeited, but were displeased with the harshness of 
the statue [13].  
2.3.4 Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) 
Every person, banks, or financial institution who has an interest with a financial 
institution overseas who deposit more than $10,000 in aggregate must report that relationship 
with the U.S. Treasury yearly.  There are a few exceptions to the rule: 
• U.S. military banking facilities operated by a United States financial institution are 
not considered foreign, and therefore an FBAR is not required. 
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• An officer or employee of a bank who is under supervision of the OCC, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the OTS, or the FDIC, is not required to 
report having signature or other authority over a foreign account if the officer or 
employee has no personal interest in the account. 
• An officer or employee of a domestic corporation whose equity assets exceed $10 
million and 500 or more shareholders is not required to file an FBAR if the person 
has no personal financial interest in the account. 
2.3.5 Form 8300 
The IRS form 8300 is a mirror image to the CTR.  The form needs to be filled out and 
submitted by someone who is involved in trade, business, or transactions that involve cash or 
the equivalent over $10,000.  Until February 1992, businesses were only required to fill out 
receipts on cash over $10,000 received in a 12 month period.  Since that time, the rule has 
been amended to report other forms of instruments that have financial value [56]. 
This business reporting was quite insufficient pre-1990.  The IRS stepped up and 
began assessing heavy penalties to those industries that were not submitting reports.  The 
largest case to date was against five car dealerships in the New York, which failed to file an 
IRS 8300.  Cars and the bank accounts of the dealers were seized, with fifteen people 
pleading to money laundering, structuring, and not reporting certain bank deposits [13]. 
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2.3.6 Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Since its inception in 1992, the SAR has been the most important form to mitigate 
money laundering.  Whenever a financial institution's employee “knows, suspects, or has 
reason to suspect” that a transaction have been processed that seemed suspicious, an SAR 
needs to be filled out.  There are over 23,000 institutions in the U.S. that are required to fill 
out an SAR:  basically, almost every financial institution in the U.S. is required to comply. 
The term “suspicious activity” is said to include any activity that “has no business or 
apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be 
expected to engage, and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the 
transaction after examining the available facts, including the background and possible 
purpose of the transaction”. 
A financial institution is required to file an SAR within 30 days of any suspicious 
activity.  Failure to file an SAR will expose the bank and those responsible to action resulting 
in fines and monetary penalties.  Since the inception of the system, over 125,000 SARs have 
been filed, with over 40% of them involving possible money laundering.  The only issue with 
SARs is that there is a bit of discretion that is left in the hands of those who are required to 
file.  What is “suspicious” to one bank teller might not be “suspicious” to another.  The 
FATF has even admitted that countries do not have mandatory reporting requirements but 
only requirements to file an SAR where “suspicious activity” is involved.  This “hole” is one 
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that is of concern – many launderers are finding other ways to smurf money, such as the 
utilization of the Internet. 
2.4 Law Enforcement Tools 
This section discusses the current tools and operations law enforcement currently uses 
to track down drug traffickers and uncover money laundering schemes.  Though the OCC, 
OTS, Federal Reserve, and IRS all play a role in mitigating money laundering through the 
rules and regulations by way of forms and audit trails, it is the DEA and Customs Service, 
with help from the FBI and international groups such as the MI-5 and MI-6 from Britain, 
who are at the front line of the war on money laundering and drug trafficking [13]. 
In order to target money transmitters, the Bank Secrecy Act and U.S. Patriot Act has a 
way to require any United States domestic financial institutions to target transactions 
between specific geographical locations of high criminal activity of greater than a specified 
value.  These are through Geographic Target Orders (GTOs) and last for 180 days [57].  In 
1997, the first GTO was targeted at money remitters in New York who were wiring money to 
Columbia.  These GTOs resulted in a find of $500 million being wired through this line 
every year – most of the money was drug money.  Due to the GTOs, laundering of money 
went back to smuggling the cash which in turn accounted for an increase in cash seizures 
[57]. 
 
42 
 
 
The Office of National Drug Control Policy is the administration of the High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program. This program is designed to locate 
areas in the U.S. with the greatest drug trafficking problem.  The key priorities of the 
program are [58]: 
• Evaluate drug threats in the region’s drug threat 
•  Design policies to focus efforts that combat drug trafficking threats 
•  Develop and finance programs to implement strategies to mitigate drug 
trafficking 
• Improve the effectiveness of drug control effort 
• Reduce and eliminate drug trafficking 
2.5 Conducting Investigations 
When conducting a money laundering investigation, there are four steps in the 
process: identify the unlawful activity, identify and track the financial transactions, perform a 
financial analysis of the target, and freeze/confiscate assets.  This section will explore each of 
the steps. 
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2.5.1 Identify the Unlawful Activity – Step 1 
The majority of money laundering investigations start as a result of previous 
investigations into a person’s illegal activity of narcotics, gambling, smuggling, etc.  The 
investigators need to make sure that the unlawful activity that they are looking into is one of 
“specified unlawful activities” that could potentially be a money laundering scheme.  Under 
sections 1956 and 1957 of the BSA, the government must be able to show that the funds 
came from one of the over 200 “specified unlawful activities [46]”.  The most common ones 
in money laundering cases are drug trafficking, crimes on the environment, banks violations 
and drug trafficking.  
2.5.2 Identify and Track the Financial Transaction – Step 2 
This is the step in where the money is revealed.  As stated in step one, most money 
laundering investigations occur as a result of an investigation in narcotics, for example, by 
the same person.  Investigations track the finances from the target using the following: 
• Documents obtained when a search warrant was issued. Things like money 
receipts, brokerage statements or their address, wire transfer receipts, 
automobile records, etc. 
• Law enforcement databases.  For example, FinCEN’s database that holds 
SARs, CTRs, CMIRs, etc. should be the starting point of the investigation. 
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• Databases that come from the commercial sector.  Documents such as credit 
reports and court dockets which may give a great deal of information about 
the target. 
• Public records such as corporate information, social security, information 
about any bankruptcy activity 
• Places that distribute licenses such as the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, marriage 
licenses, and any public notary records [13]. 
2.5.3 Financial Analysis of the Target – Step 3 
Two tools are used to in investigate a target’s financial situation and determine if the 
spending habits they have reflect those of a launderer or one whose financial activity is 
normal.  The first is called a “net worth analysis” and is used when the assets of a targeted 
individual are noticeable, and the other is labeled a “source and application of funds 
analysis” which is used where the spending habits are noticeable.  
2.5.3.1  Net Worth Analysis 
Net worth analysis is a tool that determines if a suspect has acquired assets at a rate 
that is over the rate of income from sources where she obtains it legitimately.  This is much 
more easily done when the suspect acquires and disposes of tangible assets or the spending 
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habits are more transient and the lifestyle is “luxurious” in nature.  The case United States v. 
Sorentino, the court called attention to this analysis method and stated it like this: 
“The government makes out a prima facie case  ... if it establishes the defendant’s 
opening net worth  ... with reasonable certainty and then shows increases in his/her net worth 
for each year in question with which, added to his/her non-deductable expenditures and 
excluding his/her known non-taxable receipts for the year, exceed his/her reported taxable 
income by a substantial amount…. The jury may infer that the defendant’s excess net worth 
increases represent unreported taxable income if the government either shows a likely source, 
… or negates all possible non-taxable sources.”  
2.5.3.2  Source and Application of Funds Analysis 
The source and application of funds analysis is a toll that is used to discover if 
someone that is accused of money laundering has obtained assets at a rate larger than his 
legitimate income level.  This works quite well when the target is hyper spending and living 
over his or her normal means. 
 The analysis is quite simple – the cash that is not identified is equal to the total cash 
expenditures minus the total income of cash.  This works when a person’s income is known 
and has been reported or not known and not reported.  
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2.5.4 Freeze and Confiscate Assets – Step 4 
Seizure and freezing the money is important to a laundering investigation.  Though 
this topic of how the confiscation occurs is outside the realm of this thesis, it is important to 
note this step and understand that the timing of this step is of the upmost importance.  Most 
money launderers will gather a large amount of money over a period of time and then send 
out the money in allocated blocks.  It would not make much sense if the accounts were frozen 
after a large withdrawal was performed. 
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CHAPTER 3.  CYBERLAUNDERING 
The board of the International Monetary Fund in November of 2001 decided to 
“intensify fund activities in the international fight against money laundering, to expand these 
efforts to include anti-terrorist financing activities [17]”. The plan recognizes that “funds are 
recycled in the financial system through a variety of layering techniques which take 
advantage of regulatory and supervisory weaknesses.”  In 2002, the U.S. laid out a National 
Money Laundering Strategy acknowledging the difficulty of estimating just how large the 
issue with money laundering is.  The percentage of recorded GDP that is laundered money is 
worsened by the ease of cyberlaundering [43]. 
As of 2008, over 1.5 billion people worldwide are connected and use the Internet 
[18].  This access to information is a facilitator for world trade at speeds unheard of not too 
long ago.  Because of this, the Internet is abundant with crime and criminal alliances.   
Financial value can be transported as anonymous, tax-free, and unregulated across borders 
and jurisdictions.  This has been putting a great deal of burden on regulations, law 
enforcement, and legal systems; especially in developing countries where these systems are 
weak to begin with. 
Cybercrime has experienced high growth from 2001 to 2007 – attacks on computer 
servers have risen by 1343% [21].  This trend is partially caused by software weaknesses, 
operating system hole exposures, and network vulnerabilities.  Furthermore, this growing 
number represents attacks on the financial sector.  The International Data Corporation 
reported that over 57% of all attacks from last year have been initiated on the financial sector 
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[45].  FINCEN’s Suspicious Activity Reports for Computer Intrusions have topped a 500% 
increase over the past year.  This amounts to about $222 billion dollars of money laundered 
annually through the Internet [45]. 
Due to the Internet’s speed and expediency, financial transaction costs and float time 
are greatly reduced. These attributes are even more attractive to criminally oriented entities 
as it decreases disclosure and risk.   For example, within fifteen minutes after the slammer 
worm of 2003 was introduced into the Internet, 27 million people in South Korea had no cell 
phone nor Internet access, five of the Internet’s 13 root servers crashed, and Continental 
Airlines had to suspend flights due to absence of online access [63].  The ability to disrupt 
operations of businesses globally and quickly is an issue.  Currently we do not have the 
policy or regulations to combat it. 
There is no standard law or regulations that set up guidelines on how to discover and 
bring online money laundering to justice.  This chapter will define and discuss what is known 
about cyberlaundering. 
3.1  Cyberbanking 
To be able to understand money laundering as a cyber crime, cyber banking needs to 
be explained.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has placed cyberbanking as a 
high priority by creating an e-Money council to assess how well the regulations and law 
enforcement system is doing with regards to electronic banking and online payment systems. 
The money we traditionally use is easy, acceptable, and anonymous.  It is generally 
limited to a small amount and the country that issued the currency.  In a cyberbanking 
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system, traditional currency is eradicated.  Rather than paying with a tangible object, 
cyberpayments facilitate the transfer of financial value through online bank accounts, smart 
cards, or Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards [19].  This cyberpayment system has the 
good qualities of traditional currency with added benefits such as widespread acceptability, 
security, and anonymity.   The transfer velocity of cyberbanking is what allows the 
movement of large amount of dollars as fast as the computer can transfer the funds.  The 
primary issue lies in whether cyberbanking should be and continue to be anonymous and as a 
result immune to banking regulations and law enforcement. 
Many world organizations have created facets to quickly and safely buy and sell 
goods over the Internet.  As an example, Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) was created in 
1997 based on x.509 certification as a means to secure credit card transactions over insecure 
networks.  SET introduced duel signature which links two messages that are intended for two 
different receivers. The customer wants to send her order information to the merchant and the 
payment information to the bank. The merchant does not need to know the customer's credit 
card number, and the bank does not need to know information concerning the customer's 
order. The link proves that the payment is intended for this order.   SET failed simply due to 
the responsibility of the user providing a valid certificate.  If malware was placed on a user’s 
machine, this certificate could be compromised and the responsible party would be the 
unknowing customer. 
Cyberbanks are not typical banks as one would expect.  They do not offer deposit 
services but act as financial intermediaries for financial transactions.  Cyberbanks can be 
unregulated [59] and work in an environment where anonymous transactions take place 
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instantaneously.  Cyberbanks can also operate anywhere in the world and avoid detection by 
using forwarding systems electronically. 
The Treasury’s Department’s Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is responsible for 
granting approval to companies looking to offer secure regulated U.S. banking services on 
the Internet (the OTS is the primary regulator of all federal and state chartered thrift 
institutions). 
The OTS has granted approval to only two U.S. thrift holding companies to offer 
electronic banking services over the Internet.  The first approval was granted on in 1995 with 
Cardinal Bancshares Inc.  The second grant was given to Atlanta Internet Banks in 1997.  
AIB is the first approved and regulated bank that is exclusive to Internet transactions.  AIB is 
required to adhere to the guidelines that were set out in the OTS “Statement on retail on-line 
personal computer banking” [13]. 
3.1.1  Cyberbanking Data Encryption 
Online banking services need to provide strong data encryption.  In 1993, the federal 
government created the National Information Infrastructure Forum to create a universal 
banking encryption standard for financial transactions on the Internet.  They proposed the 
Clipper Chip, an 80 bit encryption system which contained a key that would enable the 
government to have access if they needed it.  Many electronic rights organizations were 
against the Clipper chip, disputing that it would have the effect of not only possible illegal 
government surveillance, but also the design was secret, and therefore businesses might be 
forced to adopt an insecure system placing more risk on their computer structure [60]. 
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Furthermore, better security standards such as PGP (pretty good privacy) were sprouting, 
pointing the attention of cyber banking in another direction. 
Today, most online financial banking makes use of the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocol.  This protocol prevents eavesdropping, forgery, and creates non-repudiation.  
The issue that arises is that the government no longer has a “back door” and therefore 
cyberbanking payments may be immune to anti money laundering efforts (anonymous and 
untraceable).  TLS makes use of the SHA-1 algorithm which has been recently hacked [20] 
complicating the use of TLS as a cyberbanking method even further.  
3.1.2  Stored Value Cards 
Stored value cards are similar to debit cards with the exception that the card is loaded 
with money.  The use of the card is completely untraceable and the financial limits on the 
cards are unbounded [45].  Visa cash, Mondex Cards, and FeliCa are the currently the largest 
producers of stored value cards.  A launderer with the proper software may be able to transfer 
billions of dollars on stored value card(s) out of the country.  Currently, these cards lack the 
adequate controls to prevent this type of money laundering [45].  
3.2  Cyberpayments 
Cyberpayment systems are an international work in progress.  Due to the speed of 
technology, issues cannot be addresses as progress moves forward.  Many different systems 
are in development, but two dominant generic systems have undergone development, testing, 
and operation.  The first is stored value smart cards, and the other is Internet based payment 
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systems known as electronic cash or “e-cash”.  These two technologies are beginning to 
converge thus creating one large cyberpayment infrastructure. 
Technical and commercial standards in the cyberpayment industry have been a 
progressing issue in international financial activity.  This has led to a system-level control to 
discourage any single country from abusing the system.  The beneficial factor in 
cyberpayment systems is their ability to take advantage of the deployment of network 
technology.  This system allows for a peer to peer value transferring, payer anonymity for the 
customer, and a greater ability to conduct purchases internationally. 
In discussing the cyberpayment-money laundering realm, it should be noted that the 
same technologies underlying cyberpayment products can be used as information gathering 
tools by law enforcement and payment system regulators.  The privacy implications of the 
enhanced government surveillance of information is an issue often criticized as infringing on 
the right of privacy, but is essential to battling criminal activity.  For law enforcement, his 
thesis takes into consideration the Freedom of Information Act of 2007 and the Privacy Act 
of 1974. 
3.2.1  Cyberpayment System Models 
Cyberpayment systems currently are structured in four standard ways – the merchant 
issuer model, the bank issuer model, the non-bank issuer model, and the peer to peer model. 
3.2.1.1  The Merchant Issuer Model 
The simplest of the four models, this system is where the smart card issuer and seller 
of the service or good is the same.  A good example is where a user will place cash onto a 
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smart card that only is redeemable for a particular merchant and will not work with other 
merchants such as the Washington D.C. metro system. 
 
Deposits
Smart Card
Customer
Merchant
Traditional 
Money
Withdrawals
Banking System
 
Figure 3.  Merchant-Issuer Model 
3.2.1.2  The Bank Issuer Model 
This model is where the merchant and issuers of the smart cards are different entities.  
This is where the customer loads money onto a card handled by an issuing bank, and then 
uses it with a merchant who interacts with a different bank.  The two banks report to a 
clearinghouse to transfer the balance.  Preloaded credit cards by Visa, debit cards, and proton 
cards in Belgium are examples.  
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Figure 4.  Bank-Issuer Model 
 
3.2.1.3  The Non-Bank Issuer Model 
This model is where users will buy electronic cash with traditional money and use it 
at participating merchants who accept that particular electronic cash.  
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Figure 5.  Non Bank Issuer Model 
 
 
3.2.1.4  Peer to Peer Model 
Electronic cash issued from banks or an entity that is not a bank can be transferred 
between users.  The only time contact is established is during the conversion of traditional 
money to electronic cash and vice versa (during redemption).  This sort of model is most 
susceptible to money laundering as there is no bank involved and conversions can bounce 
from person to person rapidly. 
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Figure 6.  Peer to Peer Model 
 
3.2.2  Developments in Cyberpayment Systems 
Different areas of the world have been launching small projects through joint ventures 
with the credit card industry.  Many of these have been value stored smart cards and online 
payment abilities.  This will create an infrastructure with many different types of payment 
products. 
Credit cards have been the dominant form of online payment for many years.  The 
security in credit cards is performed through signatures, photos and Card Verification Value 
(CVV) numbers.  Since credit cards are used more for illicit use of one’s payment account, 
they are not the primary system for cyberlaundering.  Ten years ago, the use of DigiCash by 
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David Chum was the primary method for laundering money by means of electronic currency 
[24].  DigiCash provided true anonymity by introducing a number of cryptographic 
protocols.  DigiCash declared bankruptcy in 1998, and was acquired by InfoSpace in 2002 
[24].   Currently, there are five electronic payment systems that are the front runners in 
electronic currency. 
3.2.2.1  Virtual Wallet Systems 
The major player in a virtual wallet system is PayPal.  PayPal is a money transfer 
system that was launched for customer-to-customer transaction but has now taken on 
business to customer accounts at well. PayPal acts as an unbiased mediator offering low risk 
to both seller and buyer of the money.  PayPal accepts money from the purchaser by charging 
the purchaser's credit card for any transactions, debiting a checking account for any 
payments, or having PayPal debit the purchaser’s PayPal account that has a positive balance 
for the purchase.  The personal information required to start a PayPal account is a name, e-
mail address, credit card information, and billing address for a credit card.   One interesting 
service that PayPal provides merchants is the ability upload a file with e-mail addresses and 
amounts, and pays the recipients in bulk.   This PayPal tool could potentially be used for 
smurfing.  Other virtual wallet services are PNC Virtual Wallet and Microsoft’s Virtual 
Wallet. 
3.2.2.2  Smart Cards and Stored Value Cards 
German Geldkarte is a credit card sized plastic card with a computer chip embedded 
in the card. Payment information in the form of currency value is stored on this chip and can 
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be retrieved with card readers designed especially for the card. This feature makes smart 
cards independent from central servers and allowing anonymous transactions. Smart cards 
can store up to 80 times more information than magnetic stripe stored value cards [25].   
Another major player in Smart Cards is Mondex.  Mondex is an electronic cash system that 
has received ITSEC level E6 (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria’s highest 
rating of security) [22].  It is known to be one the most secure alternatives to traditional 
currency.  Mondex is a joint venture between Wells Fargo, MasterCard, AT&T Universal 
card Services, Discover card, Michigan National Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, and First 
Chicago [23].  Stored value cards and smart cards are referred to interchangeably for the 
remainder of the thesis. 
3.2.2.3  Escrow Services 
Escrow.com, auctionchex.com, docdata.com, and iloxx.de are all major companies 
who partake in escrow.  These are also known as “Customer to Customer Contracts” These 
services allow buyers and sellers to set certain stipulations online. After both parties agree to 
these rules, the escrow service emails the buyer, asking him to pay the amount for the 
service. The payment can be made via credit card, personal or business check, money order, 
cashier's check or wire transfer.  This is kept in an escrow account, and the seller is informed 
via email to enter the site to get the shipping details. After the goods are received, inspected 
and approved by the buyer, the seller is paid by the escrow service for the goods. If the buyer 
is dissatisfied and returns the goods, the seller will also be given time to inspect and accept 
the goods as returned. In this case, the escrow service returns the money to the buyer.   Based 
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on research, it seems that the level of security of escrow service is higher than smart cards 
and virtual wallet systems. 
3.2.2.4  Direct Billing 
Some systems use software that allows the user to make purchases, which are later 
billed through the Internet Service Provider or a phone bill. Most prominently are eCharge 
Phone, which is a web front end to the 800/900-premium rate telephone billing network.  
eCharge now also participates in creating virtual credit, debit and value storage allowing 
customers to make online purchases without releasing private financial information.  
3.2.2.5  Micropayments 
Micropayments are a means to transfer small amounts of money over the Internet.  
These payments are so small that credit cards or other electronic processing methods would 
be impractical to use for each payment.  As a result, small businesses sprang up where users 
can deposit small sums of money ranging from a dollar and up, to be used on participating 
websites.  The participating websites will extract small amounts of currency based on what 
the user is purchasing, and the micropayment company will perform larger debits from the 
customer. 
3.3  Methods of Cyberlaundering 
This section provides an overview for the methods of online money laundering that 
have been identified in literary review.  According to these methods, network-based 
cyberbanking and stored value type smart cards have provided opportunities for money 
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launderers to conceal the movement of illicit funds.  Identifying methods in which 
cyberpayment tools are used by launderers can help to draw a clearer picture for abuse within 
cyberpayment networks.  These examples, along with the examples discussed in the next 
chapter, will help to determine the rules and regulations that need to be put in place in order 
to start mitigating cyberlaundering. 
3.3.1  Electronic Currency 
Non-fiat currency on the World Wide Web, such as digital gold currency (DGC) has 
been under scrutiny for proving to be a method to launder money electronically.  DGC is a 
type of electronic currency that is based on gold ounces.   This is very similar to the U.S. 
paper gold certificate was exchangeable for gold before 1933 [61].  DGC is not regulated – it 
is based on trust.  As of April 2008, DGC providers held over 9.6 tons of gold as reserves to 
back up their currency [26].  This was 47% increase since January 2007 and worth 
approximately $280 million. 
DGC offers global world currency as precious metals have international currency 
codes [27]. 
3.3.2  Online Casinos 
Online casinos are defined as “the provision of opportunities to play games of chance 
or obtain access to sports of race bookmaking via computer networks”.  While these 
networks are used for entertainment purposes, they have also provided a way to launder 
money quickly.  The dirty money is played at the casinos, and the payment of clean money 
returned to the launderer.  These transactions are done almost instantaneously and can be 
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done from home.  Because the Internet is global, many of these online casinos do not fall 
under any particular jurisdiction.  According to Forrester Research roughly 1,400 online 
gambling sites are in existence [32]. 
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CHAPTER 4.  HYPOTHETICAL CYBERLAUNDERING METHODS 
Based on the research conducted on the methods of money laundering and the 
regulations imposed on them, along with the current cyberlaundering methods previously 
discussed, I have determined additional cyberlaundering methods that have not been yet 
mentioned.  These methods become additional facets through which criminals can wash their 
money without jurisdiction or uncovering their identity. 
According to John Wagner, the BSA/AML Compliance Officer for the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency, one of the largest threats to money laundering currently is the use 
of stored value cards.  As stated earlier, stored value cards represents money on deposit with 
the issuer, and are similar to debit cards.  The difference between stored value cards and debit 
cards is that debit cards are usually issued to an individual account holder under name 
issuance, while stored value cards are anonymous.  The first three hypothetical 
cyberlaundering methods involve using stored value cards.  The remaining seven discuss 
other methods of cyberlaundering. 
4.1  Stored Value Payments for Drugs 
Drugs can be sold to users in exchange for disposable smart cards denominated in 
amounts typically associated with street drug transactions rather than normal money typically 
used in buying drugs.  These smart cards would then be pooled by the street dealer where 
they could be then taken to a merchant. For a standard fee, the merchant would then upload 
the electronic value from the cards to a financial institution.  Once the funds have entered a 
legitimate payment system, they are sent to a domestic or offshore account.  This follows the 
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same process as the placement, layering, and integration phases of traditional money 
laundering. 
4.2  Transferring Value through Cyberpayments 
One practical way drug trafficking proceeds can be stored is through smart cards of 
high value.  Some smart cards and stored value cards can hold fiat currency in the upwards of 
thousands of dollars allowing the trade of illicit funds to not only be anonymous but also 
allow easy transfer of large amounts of currency.  These cards are smaller and weigh less 
than traditional currency, providing an incentive for drug traffickers.  The cards are then 
disposed of through depositing the funds from the smart cards into an offshore bank.  
A second way of transporting value beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities 
could be to transfer stored value over a telephone system or electronic online system that 
works with the monetary value on smart cards. Such products offer criminals a rapid and 
effective means for transferring and consolidating a stream of illicit funds. Once funds enter 
the payment system it is impossible to distinguish the illegal money from legal funds.  
4.3  Transferring Value through Network Based Systems 
Smart cards with a low balance have the ability to transfer their value onto personal 
computers, which would then transfer that value over the Internet, using increasingly 
available anonymous remailers to conceal the points of origin of illicit funds. Recipients 
could then pull the funding together and reintegrate the value into the payment system.  
The ability to use the Internet in this fashion is troublesome – smart cards of small 
values generally are not seen as a threat.  A launderer would keep the values low – perhaps 
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under $100 to prevent any sort of detection of the structuring scheme.  These values could 
then be smurfed into accounts offshore where AML regulation is not as strict or in a financial 
institution where privacy of customer accounts are enforced. 
4.4  Payments via the World Wide Web 
This example of Cyberpayment system misuse involves a fraudulent not for profit 
business that only accepts electronic value as a means for donations. Funds collected for an 
apparently legitimate charity can be in actuality dirty money obtained by drug trafficking.  
These funds can be uploaded from virtual wallets, and then redistributed from one financial 
institution to another individual or group someplace else on the globe.  
4.5  Blended Phishing 
Phishing is not a new technique for the cyber world.  Phishing is a criminally 
fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information by looking like a 
trustworthy entity [62].  Many of the old tactics of phishing are no longer working due to the 
increased awareness of this crime.  As a result, criminals are becoming more devious in their 
phishing attempts.  Not only will they use a familiar front to deceive someone, (such as 
mocking up a illegitimate website to seem legitimate) but perhaps use various techniques 
such as email, websites, and VOIP (Voice over IP) to mask the drop point of legitimate 
money. 
A launderer, under this method, is looking for individuals to assist with smurfing 
illegal funds into an account.  The launderer has an account with illicit funds that need to be 
moved to another account inconspicuously and without any flags.  In order to do this, a 
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launderer will send out an email asking participants to deposit a certain amount of money 
into their accounts and move it to another account.  The email can be spoofed to represent a 
different bank instead of the one that the money is coming from – the location of where the 
money is coming from can be fronted by a website, and with the use of voice over IP (VoIP), 
a launderer can also easily set up a number that users can inquire more about this “activity” 
to further enhance their trust in this process. 
The assistant will then be asked to go to the banks site, and withdraw “x” sum of 
currency.  This currency should be deposited into their account, and within a certain time 
frame, the currency should then be deposited or wired to a different account less a 
percentage.  Since the assistant is obtaining a portion of the dirty money without knowing 
that the money is in fact illegitimate, there is not much incentive to report this activity. 
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Figure 7.  Blended Phishing Technique 
 
Blended phishing works by spoofing phone, email, and websites in an attempt to fool 
a user into believing that funds from the launderer are coming from a location that they truly 
are not.  In regards to VoIP, the launderer will spoof a caller ID, perhaps using the phone 
number of a bank they are pretending to represent, in an attempt to trick the assistant. 
ANI, or the Automatic Number Identification, is a system in the United States used 
by telephone companies to determine the number of the calling party.  Some VoIP companies 
will allow you to run your own Private Branch Exchange (PBX) which houses the ANI 
system.  Configuring the files on the PBX will allow you to spoof any number to a caller.  
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Some of the current companies that support running a private PBX are VoicePulse and 
Nufone [31]. 
Email spoofing works by using telnet to access an exchange server running the 
sending mail transfer protocol (SMTP).  Once a launderer discovers how to access a bank’s 
exchange server, the launderer will send out an email that contains legitimate headers acting 
as a bank’s email.  Since many mass mailing emails do not encourage mailing back, 
correspondence can be done over the spoofed VoIP service rather than through email. 
Web phishing, to a trusting user, can fool someone into accessing an illegitimate site 
to further prove the validity of the funds. A launderer could set up a phishing site to perhaps 
lead an individual into believing that funds are coming from a particular bank.  This can be 
done through content theft of a legitimate site, and setting up a URL with a similar name.  
Another method would be to perform content theft of a legitimate site, and then poison the 
DNS Cache in an attempt to relay the IP address of where the attacker’s fake site is to a valid 
domain name. 
With careful planning and structuring the use of different phishing entities, social 
engineering is a harmful threat in acquiring an individual to participate in a money 
laundering scheme.  If a launderer can utilize participants only once, then banks do not file 
SARs for moving money from one financial institution to another under the amount of 
$3,000 USD [13].   Furthermore, a launderer can set up shell companies and have the money 
deposited into an online bank not regulated by the United States.  The deposits would look 
like legitimate income for the shell company. 
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4.6  Botnets 
Botnets are group of software robots that run autonomously and automatically.  The 
robots or bots are generally running without the computer owner’s knowledge.  These bots 
can be downloaded through malicious email, malformed images, embedded in additional 
software, or just downloaded and executed through a computer. 
Botnets are controlled by a “bot herder” or an individual/group who knows how to 
command the bots to perform certain activities on infected computers.  Bots can do anything 
from send spam to delete files off of your computer.  In this scenario, the bots can be used to 
launder money through ones banking system in an attempt to obtain clean money. 
In 2004, a bot was discovered to be transmitting the keystrokes of infected computers 
to a chat room on the Internet Relay Chat [30].  These bots can be used to compromise 
username and log in information of an infected person’s machine into their online banking 
system.  As a result, a bot herder would then be able to access the bank account of the 
infected user, and wire money into a compromised machine's account and then out to their 
account.  To the user, it will just look like a mistaken withdrawal and corrective deposit. 
One of the more popular bots that enable traffic sniffing and keystroke logging is 
Agobot.  Agobot is written in C++ and released under a GPL license.  Due to its high 
modular structure, creating new functions for the bot is easy to do.  Agobot in this scenario 
would be created with a keystroke logger and record all instances of a key stroke.  It would 
be supplied within an Internet Relay Chat server and channel information to relay the logged 
keystrokes back to the bot master.  The channel is secured, and a list of authorized users is 
provided (the names of the users who can control the bots). 
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To infect a computer, the launderer could simply exploit the vulnerability of an 
operating system or service.  Malformed HTML files that exploit Internet Explorer 
vulnerabilities, or Peer to Peer Direct Client to Client file exchange can be used as well.   
Once a bot is installed, the first thing that it will do is update the registry key found at                      
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in 
order to start with Windows.  From there, the bot would connect to the IRC server and begin 
sending keystrokes out to a channel. When a user types in a common website URL to a bank, 
this information will be transferred to the launderer. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Botnet Laundering 
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Having access to an online bank account, the launderer could then deposit funds into 
the user's bank account and then transfer them out as a payment to a shell account.  The 
online deposit and withdrawal of funds can be quick and small, which might not even tip off 
a bank.  Furthermore, if a deposit is made into an account, and the same amount is then 
withdrawn, the owner of the account used to launder money is likely to assume the deposit 
was simply an error and not inform the bank concerning the activity. 
4.7  Micropayment Smurfing 
The placement stage of money laundering is the most important stage.    If the 
placement aspect is done quickly, as this is the argument for the dangerousness of 
cyberlaundering, the layering and integration stages will become more difficult to discover as 
well. 
With this in mind, one area that money launderers might exploit is the area of micro-
payments and micro-loans. Micropayments refer to low-value electronic financial 
transactions, ranging from a fraction of a cent to a few dollars [33].   Amazon.com has a 
patented one click payment system as a service to smaller websites. Visitors to these sites can 
donate to the website host by clicking through Amazon’s service.  Amazon in return will take 
a percentage of the donation and a service fee [34]. Micropayments on the Internet make far 
more sense in a medium where margin costs are minimal. This has unleashed focus by 
programmers and web site designers. Initially micropayments became Internet phenomena 
when websites and companies would pay affiliates, other websites that offered a hyperlink 
and/or banner ad to the paying website. Often these payments were fractional per actual click 
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through. For example, company X pays company Y a few dollars for every one thousand 
visitors that are funneled from company Y’s website to company X’s site. 
The new phenomenon are companies who allow a user to set up an uninsured bank 
account on line to pay for small finances such as buying points for an application on an 
online system such as facebook for a dollar or less.   Such a system could work by a 
launderer setting up an account or multiple accounts with a micropayment system, and then 
creating  
 
 
Figure 9.  Micropayment Smurfing 
 
some application on line where the illicit funds could be used.  A launderer could create an 
application that would accept these micropayments and therefore provide legitimate receipt 
for the funds.  Furthermore, the system could drastically reduce the ability of law 
enforcement to conduct Geographically Targeted Orders (GTO).  
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4.9  Return Merchandise Scheme 
As of last year, 875 million consumers have shopped online.  The number of Internet 
shoppers is up 40% in two years [35].  Billions of dollars are exchanged for goods and 
services per year solely off the Internet and that number is rapidly growing as people obtain 
and rely on the Internet more frequently.  The majority of these online stores allow returning 
merchandise and herein lies an illicit way to launder money.  As stated earlier in the thesis, 
legislation to prevent money laundering is placed at many of the “large purchase” 
corporations – real estate, casinos, and precious metal dealers.  Making small purchases to 
launder money was not beneficial to a launderer, and therefore legislation had no need to 
place this legislation on companies who sell items valued around $500 or less.  
 
Step1: The Illegal money is 
pulled by the launderer
Step 2: The launderer 
makes purchases to many 
online businesses
Step 3: The purchases are 
“returned” and delivered 
back to the account, all 
accounted for as legal tenderLaunderer
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Online Shopping Store
Online Shopping Store
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Figure 10.  Return Merchandise Scheme 
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With the advent of the Internet, a launderer can structure smaller amounts of money 
through legitimate online businesses quickly.  For example, a launderer would make a 
purchase of 25 toys at an online toy store of $20.00 each.  This payment of $500.00 could be 
done at 100 different stores around the globe, allowing a launderer to place $50,000 of illicit 
funds into the system.  The launderer could then ask for a return on the merchandise, 
integrating the funds into legal tender.  This sort of movement would be too difficult for a 
launderer to do without the Internet – he/she would need to physically visit each shop.  This 
would raise suspicion as well as the activity would be too time consuming. 
In chapter 6, a suggested tool is briefly introduced to mitigate this method of 
cyberlaundering.  It would require merchants by law to participate in a money laundering 
detection system. The system would not create much overhead for the businesses.  Rather, it 
will provide extra security for an online business to not fall into facilitating cyberlaundering. 
4.10  Online Stock Trading 
Online stock trading is becoming a bigger phenomenon each year.  Companies such 
as Ameritrade, E*Trade, Scott Trade, and Trade King are providing ways for their customers 
to purchase Initial Public Offerings and other stock options without the need for a personal 
broker.  These online methods of purchasing stock leave out a great deal of human 
interaction that once was a part of buying and selling stock.  As a result, the buying of stock 
with illegal money and selling for legal funds is a valid method for online money laundering. 
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A launderer will place funds into multiple accounts with an online trading company.  
This money will then be used to buy stock which is the layering portion of the laundering 
scheme.   Once the money has been used to purchase the shares, the launder will sell the 
shares thereby obtaining legal currency.  From there, the funds can be withdrawn from the 
online stock company and placed into an account offshore, where the money is not subject to 
anti money laundering regulation and is seen as legitimate cash from selling stock online. 
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CHAPTER 5.  CYBERLAUNDERING LEGISLATION 
Title III of the US Patriot act has provided a higher level of enforcement for 
facilitating the prevention, detection and prosecution of international money laundering at the 
level of banking regulations, record keeping, smuggling and counterfeiting currency.  
Furthermore, all regulations such as the Money Laundering Control act of 1986 and the Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970 are in place to mitigate and enforce money laundering primarily at the 
banking level.  To date, there is not much legislation on money laundering at the cyber level.  
When dealing with creating rules and regulations at the cyber level, issues such as 
intellectual property, privacy, freedom of expression and jurisdiction all take part in money 
laundering over a computer system.  The FATF has begun to focus their recommendations to 
include a more cyber crime centered approach, but has not fully deduced solid legislation on 
how to mitigate, deter and bring justice to those who launder money through the use of a 
connected computer system. 
This chapter talks about three issues that impact the cyberpayment and 
cyberlaundering system.  From there, I will discuss other policies and suggestions for 
cyberlaundering legislation. 
5.1  Law Enforcement Issues 
There are two areas that make up the law enforcement issues dealing with 
cyberlaundering.  The first is the value of cyberpayment tools to a cyberlaunderer and other 
parties who are trying to hide financial activity from government oversight.  The second area 
is the response that law enforcement should have towards those abusing cyberpayment 
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systems for cyberlaundering and how computer investigative techniques will be used to find 
patterns of abuse.  Furthermore, issues such as law enforcement jurisdiction, privacy, and 
collaboration with other agencies all are a part of this section. 
To be fully successful in enforcing cyberlaundering, the federal or state government 
must have access to the cyberpayment transaction information.  The current rules that 
oversee wiretapping and auditing of financial records from regulated AML institutions can 
provide a “hook” for additional law enforcement regulation.  Due to the fact that 
cyberpayment systems are a key system in modern society, they should have a higher 
transparency and accessibility to the law enforcement agency.  As online currency is 
equivalent to traditional currency, those who issue cyberpayments must have the same level 
of supervision from the government as do the brick and mortar banks.  Furthermore, those 
conducting illegal money laundering online should bear the same repercussions as those 
doing it physically. 
From a perspective of enforcing law, there needs to be a specific pattern of 
collaboration with financial institutions through a rewrite of policy that includes the new 
system characteristics of Cyberpayment networks.  As discussed in section 2.5.1, sections 
1956 and 1957 of the BSA outline over 20 unlawful money laundering activities.  This 
section should be amended to include cyberlaundering activity.  A good interpretation of 
legal and regulatory procedures on how government would have access to the cyberpayment 
system and the records of financial activity should be created and modified as cyberpayment 
systems evolve.  The issue that can been seen is the approach of enforcing law reactively, and 
perhaps this can be mitigated by any new cyberpayment system to comply with base 
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requirements of providing information to the government on how to access information out 
of the cyberpayment system, how best to detect fraud, and how to monitor internationally 
transferred funds. 
The law enforcement practice that is mentioned in this section raises major issues for 
consumer privacy and what investigative practices are acceptable under the current 
constitution.   There should be specific policies in place for monitoring a particular 
cyberpayment system.  If the monitoring is more invasive than what current law allows in 
order to fully prevent cyberlaundering, then customers of the system should be notified of 
this within the terms of service.  Targeted investigations could be done similarly to how 
Finsen completes GTOs (Geographic Targeting Orders) to carry out current money 
laundering investigations.   These investigations would hone in on individuals records and 
therefore provide better evidence that cyberlaundering is taking place.  This will be talked 
about more in section 5.4. 
5.2  Issues in Regulation 
The regulatory issues in cyberbanking to prevent cyberlaundering can be easily 
mitigated if many of the existing rules that are imposed on banks such as compliance with the 
Bank Secrecy Act and the current U.S. Patriot Act laws were also imposed on cyberpayment 
systems and many of the large online businesses.  If online businesses need to comply with 
the anti money laundering laws, they could explore the idea of providing their customers the 
online currency. 
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When talking about regulations of cyberpayment systems to mitigate 
cyberlaundering, there are two main subjects.  The first is coordination on an international 
front that would have the oversight of all cyberpayment systems.  This might be an extension 
of the FATF that creates regulations, or perhaps an official body in conjunction with Interpol, 
but its main role would be law enforcement and auditing.  The second is the legal 
understanding that cyberpayments play as an important contender as an addition to the 
economy. 
As far as those who have the legal authority to issue cyberpayments, this should rest 
on a mix of public and private partnerships.  In order to better mitigate cyberpayment misuse 
the number of entities that could issue cyberpayment values should be limited.  Perhaps only 
banks and Money Services Businesses (MSBs) should be able to participate.  An alternative 
to this would be to allow only financial institutions who are regulated tightly with law 
enforcement (BSA/AML regulations, etc.) be able to issue cyberpayments. 
I find that there are four areas in cyberpayment systems that should be regulated by 
the government in an attempt to mitigate cyberlaundering.  First, is the frequency and size of 
transfers of above a certain value from one person to another.  Though many wire transfer 
companies already mitigate this, there is no regulation from government that caps the amount 
of money and number of transfers that can be sent from one entity to another.  Second are the 
records of transactions.  Under the U.S. Patriot act, brick and mortar banks must hold records 
of an account for seven years after the removal of their last account.  This policy has proven 
to be helpful in locating money laundering operations and terrorist financing.  If this policy 
was in place for cyberpayment systems and audited in a similar fashion as what the Bank 
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Secrecy Act calls for, then the misuse of cyberpayment systems can be mitigated as well.  
Third is limiting the monetary value of stored value cards.  If the value of these cards is 
minimized to only allow values comparable to the efficiency of the business that they are 
intended for, then this would minimize the ability for drug dealers and money launderers to 
utilize this anonymous cash as a way to perform their illicit activities.  Fourth, would be the 
number of transactions that would be able to take place on a cyberpayment system such as a 
smart card.   For example, if a user of a smart card adds or deletes currency more than three 
times in a given day, then the card will no longer work unless approved by an official of the 
cyberpayment system.  This would not only mitigate the use of the card by the consumer, but 
would allow a system or an official of the system to place a suspicious flag on the card or 
even submit an electronic SAR on a user of the smart card when the customer tries to exceed 
the number of uses. 
Furthermore, there are four outlying areas that need to be addressed when creating 
regulations on the cyberpayment systems.  One is how the confidentiality and privacy of the 
consumer will be adhered to.  If there is not a targeting order on an account, then there need 
to be rules and regulations against the ability of enforcement to open and review logs of a 
cyberpayment system.  Furthermore, the second area that needs to be regulated is the 
necessity for limitations on law enforcement's access to information in a cyberpayment 
system.  This will prohibit unreasonable surveillance and intrusion of privacy.  Third, the 
cyberpayment system’s stability needs to be regulated including its ability to be purchased by 
another entity if needed (the liquidity of the corporation).  Lastly, there needs to be regulation 
that protects the consumers of the cyberpayment system.  It needs to be documented and 
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understood that the features of the cyberpayment system will not disclose possibilities of 
information access. 
5.3  International Coordination with Policy 
Due to the nature of online cyberpayment systems, in order to implement a successful 
anti money laundering policy, there needs to be a high level of cooperation internationally.  
Most cyberpayment systems are designed to be international, and therefore long term 
regulations that are imposed on them should be international as well.  If there is to be a 
commonality of cyberpayment system policy, then there would have to be a convergence on 
technical and operational standards.  These standards should be similar and under the same 
sort of rules that currently govern anti-abuse and fraud.  Because there has been a lean 
towards equal trade rules for the import and export of goods and services, there should be 
equal rules to the cyberpayment systems as well.  The international standardization of the 
trade rules has created economic growth.  This provides solid rationalization for the 
government to create an international cyberpayment system. 
The issue however is that when the government intervenes in the system as to enforce 
the laws, this is a defensive approach and can hurt the business of cyberpayments as far as 
competition is involved.  To mitigate this, there should be room for creating individual 
compliance – much like the structure of the current Bank Secrecy Act.  This way, there could 
be more room for innovation in the cyberpayment industry as long as certain evaluations are 
performed such as bi-annual audits from an international working group. 
81 
 
 
5.4  Suggestions for Mitigating Cyberlaundering 
Law enforcement, regulation, and international coordination are the three major 
issues that need to be addressed when establishing cyberlaundering policy.  This section will 
discuss some suggestions to mitigate cyberlaundering cohesively. 
5.4.1  Keeping Records 
The most major component to mitigate cyberlaundering is keeping records of who is 
buying and using stored valued cards, making online purchases and returning the 
merchandise, and who is using micropayment systems and other cyberpayment services.  The 
first suggestion to tackling this issue is that all cyberpayment systems and merchants who 
provide a consumer with the ability to purchase merchandise valued at more than $3,000 
USD in a period of two weeks should be required to develop and maintain a “Know Your 
Customer (KYC)” policy.  This policy should be synonymous with the KYC policy in place 
for financial banks in the U.S.  Within KYC, a Customer Identification Program (CIP) should 
be required.  The CIP program must be developed with a clear understanding of all the 
possible money laundering facilities within that system.  For example a CIP program would 
include information on the customer such as the type of account that is being offered, how 
the accounts are being set up, and other information that can identify customers to the best 
ability.  This information in a cyberpayment system could be the following: 
• Information on the ISP that the account was set up through including the IP address 
• Information on the ISPs where the account was used (where the accounts are being 
logged into to make transactions, etc.) including the IP address 
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• If the cyberpayment allows for account maintenance through the use of a phone 
service (such as customer service), tracking the location of where the phone calls are 
made. 
 
One other suggestion for mitigating cyberpayment systems online is to only allow customers 
whose ISP has a relationship with the cyberpayment system to use the cyberpayment system.  
This does limit the client base of a cyberpayment company, but may be necessary to better 
mitigate illicit activity such as laundering electronic currency.  A relationship such as this 
could mitigate anonymous use of the cyberpayment system such as launderers trying to use a 
proxy to hide their location and provide false information.  Furthermore, ISP relationships 
could assist with record keeping.  An ISP who would want to provide a more secure 
cyberpayment system would be required to maintain a registry of subscribers with 
appropriate identification information, maintain a log of traffic information with the IP 
address, maintain these logs for a certain period of time, and also provide this information to 
the cyberpayment system when needed to match logs to detect and flag suspicious activity. 
5.4.2  Authentication 
One of the largest issues in the cyberlaundering is how to prevent the misuse of credit 
systems such as smart cards or stored value cards.  One possibility is to introduce the use of a 
biometrics system into the smart card.  The biometric system could provide an alternative 
measure to locating the origin of the currency.  Furthermore, the currency may not be able to 
be used until another biometric scan is performed.  Such a system may fall under privacy 
83 
 
 
scrutiny and would not be adapted to the fullest extent.  An alternative that might work better 
as a commercial cyberpayment system is to re-introduce an authentic mechanism of 
anonymous cash where the anonymity has the ability for revocation. 
The e-gold electronic banking system provided electronic currency, but the only 
information necessary to open an account was an email address [36] which ultimately led the 
company to be indicted by a federal grand jury for laundering.  Since this incident, along 
with the bankruptcy of DigiCash run by David Chum, the notion of anonymous digital cash 
has not been clearly defined.  However, it is still a valid possibility of implementation if 
regulations, law enforcement, and other attributes explained in this thesis are implemented.  
E-cash should not be confused with digital money that provides a paper trail.  This currency 
however can only work if the bank issuing the currency is also the same bank where the 
currency can be deposited.  This way, if the cash is used to make illegal purchases, then the 
bank can trace where the money came from.  Furthermore, if the depositor tries to structure 
the funds by depositing the currency into separate accounts, the depositor can be identified.  
The idea to this method is to provide an algorithm that would provide anonymity when one 
customer is transferring the currency to another customer. Anonymity of the source of the 
currency (if the depositor is using the funds illicitly) and anonymity of the depositor is kept if 
the initial withdrawer is using the funds anonymously. 
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Figure 11.  Simple Electronic Cash Arrangement 
 
 
 The three major money wire transfer systems (SWIFT, CHIPS and Fedwire) for the 
banking industry use heavily authenticated protocols to securely transfer currency from one 
financial institution to another.  The methods are known as Financial Cryptology (FC) and 
incorporate blind signatures as well as strong RSA encryption.  Similar methods can be 
applied to authenticate users for a cyberpayment system.  The use of Kerberos, certificates, 
and digital signature algorithms can all play a part in authentication.  Certain open source 
modifications to the Kerberos system can be installed on a machine that wishes to use 
cyberpayment system.  This could provide a higher level of authentication to prevent illicit 
misuse of the cyberpayment system.  
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5.4.3  Tracking & Trigger Systems 
In order to mitigate cyberlaundering, it is imperative that a cyberlaundering system 
houses classifier systems along with data mining tools that utilize artificial intelligence 
algorithms to raise flags in the event of suspicious activity. In order to preserve the 
anonymity of cyberpayment system users and stored value card users, data that is running 
through these systems shall not be disclosed unless a flag is raised.  With the use of good 
artificial intelligence systems, suspicious activity can be detected early in a cyberlaundering 
scheme. 
There is a necessity for an online banking system to prove due diligence of 
compliance with the international cyberlaundering laws.   This can be enforced by proving to 
federal auditors that a cyberpayment system runs such a system by means of a continuing or 
random audit.  The way that this can be done is by artificial intelligence (AI) to match 
activity into a chain and compare it to historical information in the same account along with 
comparing it to other cyberpayment accounts in the same group.  When locating suspicious 
chronological transactions, the ability to target fraudulency is much easier than targeting 
one’s user account.  A deposit of $7,000 may not be suspicious but a multitude of $7,000 
deposits may.  Furthermore, by comparing the transaction chain with historical data, it may 
be feasible to locate suspicious activity by the trend in transactions rather than setting human 
thresholds, such as $3,000 to $10,000 USD (Which are thresholds for CTRs and SARs in the 
brick and mortar banking industry).  A further advantage to instigate AML AI is that the data 
mining methods can uncover laundering techniques such as structuring and patterns of 
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laundering activities.  In chapter 6, elaboration on specific data mining tools that could be 
used will be discussed. 
 One suggestion for tracing currency through a cyberpayment system is to create the 
ability for an international law enforcement group to order the tracking of a computer 
network system.  This would be exclusive to a particular system or group of cyberpayment 
systems in proximity of each other.  This order would be very similar to Geographic 
Targeting Orders (GTOs) issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury.  GTOs would fall 
under laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act here in the U.S.  The capability would be built into 
the cyberpayment system as a “traceable” protocol if there are means to do so.  For example, 
a stored value card could contain a log listing of recent activity and the values on the card.  
This activity would be tagged onto the card itself and contain other information such as the 
time that transfers occurred, and the identity of the receiver of the value.  Within a 
cybersystem, a tagging infrastructure would occur that contains the flow of funds, and the 
recipients and originator of the cybervalue system.  In addition to tagging stored value cards 
and E-cash as funds move through a cyberpayment system, Internet protocol (IP) tunneling 
techniques such as IPSec protocols or VPN could be utilized to not only provide enhanced 
security of the cyberpayment system, but also provide law enforcement with a simpler 
method of tracing funds that might be associated with cyberlaundering.  A suggestion would 
be that tags would be placed on the transfer messages.  The two IP addresses (sender and 
receiver) would create a link.  Any severs that use TCP/IP with the tagging function would 
maintain logs for law enforcement.  This information could be sent directly to a secure 
central server where other tests could be run such as AI algorithm checks.  The action of 
87 
 
 
checking the traffic could only be implemented under rules clearly laid out in the Bank 
Security Act regulations.  
5.4.4  International Database for Financial Intelligence 
As stated earlier, coordination from all nations is imperative to effectively mitigate 
cyberlaundering.  One strategy that an international group can implement is establishing a 
database housing suspicious activity from cyberpayment systems in an effort to follow illicit 
users on a global scale.  The database would need heightened security due to the sensitivity 
of such a central system.  This can be done by only allowing authenticated authorized users 
into the system and providing layered security to keep criminal activity away. 
An aspect of the “Know Your Customer Policy” at financial institutions is to verify 
that a customer is not on money laundering list or other illicit activity list such as the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals [44]. This list contains thousands 
of entries and is updated at least monthly. An easy step to mitigating cyberlaundering is 
requiring cyberpayment systems to check this list as a part of a cyberpayment system’s KYC 
policy. 
The cohesiveness of such a system will play a vital role in creating an environment 
where cyber currency can exist, while maintaining low risks of illicit activity.  The following 
chapter presents a specific tool that can be used to detect a return merchandise scheme.  It 
relies on a central database system protected by government.  This sudo-black box system 
will raise flags and only allow information to be monitored when needed. 
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CHAPTER  6.  CENTRAL ONLINE AML MERCHANT ENFORCEMENT 
TOOL (COMET) 
COMET, a Central Online AML Merchant Enforcement Tool is a hypothetical 
system that mitigates and flags suspicious cyberlaundering activity that utilizes the buying 
and selling of merchandise from online realtors.  As mentioned in section 4.9, the return 
merchandise scheme would provide a method of structuring illicit revenue online through the 
use of online stores.  By creating a secure international record keeping system, this method of 
cyberlaundering would be better mitigated. 
6.1 Overview 
COMET is a data collection system that houses the transactions of customers who 
buy goods online.  When any purchase greater than $500 is established at an online store 
currently participating in the COMET system, information about the transaction and the 
account to which it was created is sent to the COMET system.  Furthermore, any transaction 
where the merchandise is returned by the customer is sent to COMET as well.  This is done 
in all participating online merchant systems to detect possible structuring by a 
cyberlaunderer. 
Sequence matching and other data mining techniques are performed as regularly as 
possible to locate any trigger activity that relates to cyberlaundering.  Once a flag is raised, 
the system sends the appropriate information to law enforcement that can then begin to 
monitor a customer who may be involved with cyberlaundering.  This tool solely cannot be 
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Figure 12.  Overview of the COMET system 
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used to directly locate and persecute a launderer or a laundering group, but rather as another 
piece of evidence to locate and persecute those who engage in cyberlaundering. 
6.2 Design Specifications 
In order for COMET to work properly, it is essential that the cyberlaundering 
behavioral patterns and the network’s structural features perform as accurately as possible, 
limiting the amount of false positives found by the system.  Currently, many of the large 
Financial Money Laundering Software in the industry such as “Fiserv” uses various artificial 
intelligence mechanisms to automatically generate Suspicious Activity Reports.  
Furthermore, network intrusion systems such as SNORT and RealSecure Guard by IBM use 
artificial intelligence as well to detect malicious packet activity.  The same artificial 
intelligence algorithms that exist within these programs, decision tree and Bayesian 
inference, can be utilized to locate and rank cyberlaundering based on probability 
computations.  Furthermore, the design should be able to perform link analysis in order to 
identify groups of members along with group interaction patterns.  Additionally, regression 
and case-based reasoning could be included which would reveal possible leads and trends 
timelier.  Support vector machine (SVM) mining technology may be used for the system as 
SVM helps with mining highly assorted data sets [38]. 
In order to recognize cyberlaundering activity, data preparation is necessary.  This 
step in the process involves collecting data, pre-processing data, and restructuring the 
database.  Data is created by comparing the transaction records of unusual activity to those 
that merit normal behavior.  The use of support vector machine learning theory can be used 
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as an alternative to the rule based data filtering system that has been implemented in AML 
software created for the banking industry.  Furthermore, data is often noisy and may require 
database restructuring to allow for better identification of entities along with finding links 
and structure hidden in the transactions. 
6.2.1 Data Collected 
Traditionally, money laundering software at banks generally collect suspect 
information such as name, address, social security number, state identification (such as a 
drivers license), relationship to the financial institution, date of suspicious activity, dollar 
amount, and a summary characterization of the activity.  In a cyberlaundering system such as 
COMET, those materials other than driver’s license and social security number can be sent to 
the database system since most online merchants have no need to collect this information.  If 
a company did ask for it, that might discourage a user from making purchases with that 
company.  Other information should be included for the tracking of a person laundering 
money using this online method such as IP address information, customer account 
information, purchased goods, monetary value of the purchased goods, what denomination 
the money was in, how the goods were purchased (e.g. E-cash, credit, or direct banking 
withdrawal), and geography. 
6.3 Security of COMET 
COMET's security can be discussed in two areas.  One is securing the transmission 
between an online merchant and COMET.  The other is prevention of a data breach by not 
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only unauthorized users but also law enforcement using the system to mitigate 
cyberlaundering. 
When a merchant signs on to participate in the COMET system, they are verified with 
an international anti-cyberlaundering working group as a legitimate business.  Physical 
location and evidence of legitimate activity is required.  Once this is confirmed, the merchant 
is set up with a virtual private network account making use of IP tunneling protocols.  
Certificate validation is performed, and the tunnel will stay open unless requested by the 
merchant to close for explained purposes.  Requested information from the merchant is sent 
to COMET as part of the transaction process, and a response from COMET that the 
information has been received is sent back.  If for any reason the transmission fails COMET 
technicians will be notified, and the request for the information will be asked from the 
merchant at a later time.  The suggested method of encryption is the use of Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) to sign the information sent to COMET.  As of 2009, there is no known 
method for effectively breaking PGP or performing man-in-the-middle attacks once the 
certificates were exchanged. 
The COMET database will be housed at one central location.  Replication of the 
system will be performed for disaster recovery purposes and will not be active in mining for 
data relating to cyberlaundering.   The database is set up as close to a black box as those 
working with it and law enforcement that does the investigations do not know the data 
mining algorithms COMET uses to raise triggers.  COMET only accepts input from merchant 
authentication, and relays cyberlaundering triggers to those who are responsible for carrying 
out investigations on cyberlaunderers. 
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6.4 Investigative Triggers 
Laundering money through the use of online business entities is rarely performed 
under the same labeled account from multiple online merchants.  Rather there is a behavioral 
pattern that occurs over time involving sets of real world entities. 
Traditionally, anti money laundering detection had two categories: usual legal activity 
and unusual illegal activity.  The issue with this was when two different people were engaged 
in a similar transaction, one person might be found guilty of money laundering while the 
other was not.  This is because money laundering is a motive of wrongdoing rather than an 
actual criminal activity.  “Usual” and “unusual” activity is a relational choice based on 
behavioral activity where “suspicious” activity is a varying judgment call based on the 
legitimacy of a transaction.  The idea of COMET is to not only associate rules of triggers 
based on the customer, accounts, products, geography and time, but to use artificial 
intelligence to better determine suspicious activity based on records of merchandise bought 
and returned. 
Because expert rules cannot effectively determine the probability of a suspicious 
transaction, each suspicion indicator needs to be weighed, scored, and ranked in order of 
severity.  The uniqueness of COMET is that the perspective of raising a flag is subject 
oriented rather than transaction oriented.  Customer due diligence should focus on finding 
and determining behavior patterns rather than learning from simple background knowledge.  
To improve on locating these behavior patterns, COMET will not only look at transactions 
made to trigger an investigation but also to accounts and users in where abstractions pulled 
from data consolidation where similar information is used to create clusters. 
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6.4.1 Network Forensics 
Once an account has been flagged and enforcement has been notified, methods used 
in network forensics make it feasible to trace and physically locate a launderer.  As discussed 
earlier in the thesis, better cooperation between law enforcement and Internet Service 
Providers will help in tracking down where users are located in a cyberpayment scheme.  
ISPs will also assist with perhaps other transaction data that could link more than one party 
together who is involved in a particular cyberpayment scheme.  Future development of IP 
traceback methods will help to uncover where cyberlaundering activity is happening.  Bloom 
filters could also be used to determine the location of an IP as long as the routers of which 
the traffic is coming through support it. 
6.4.2 Burden of Proof 
COMET is a system simply to assist law enforcement in tracking cyberlaundering 
activity where the return merchandise scheme is performed.  The burden of proof for the 
system relies on law enforcement and not on COMET solely.  Though the system is designed 
to minimize the false positives, there is a percentage of risk associated with any data mining 
system where the flags could inaccurately locate activity and mark it as suspicious.  The law 
and regulations under COMET should allow for proving a person guilty of cyberlaundering 
to rest in the hands of law enforcement along with additional evidence surrounding the 
convicted not obtained by COMET but by other methods. 
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6.5 Ongoing Investigation 
Once COMET alerts authorities of a red flag, criminal persecution should not go 
underway immediately.  In the banking industry, FinCEN recommends that any suspicious 
activity not be immediately shut down, but rather allowed to continue in an attempt to gather 
better information and real time activity [39].  COMET should be modeled after this line of 
thought.  Law enforcement, once notified of suspicious activity by COMET, should begin 
monitoring activity by this user or group of users.  This will allow authorities to perhaps 
witness cyberlaundering taking place assisting in judicial punishment.  Furthermore, allowing 
a laundering group to structure additional electronic money could assist in locating and 
tracking other people involved in the same illicit activity. 
6.6 Merchant Participation 
In order for COMET to effectively work, two major stipulations must be met.  One, 
all online merchants who allow purchases of greater than $500 USD must participate.  This 
will allow COMET to effectively locate laundering activity that might be structured.  
Furthermore, if a group of merchants do not participate, then COMET will not work as 
effectively.   Information on what systems is not a part of COMET will eventually become 
public knowledge.  This will simply move laundering activity to those merchants who are not 
participating so the illicit activity will go undiscovered.  In order for cyberlaundering to be 
mitigated properly, COMET must be an internationally run system and therefore every global 
merchant must participate in the system.  Any merchant who unlawfully does not participate 
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will face monetary penalty.  The cyberlaundering law enforcement working group will be 
responsible for locating and penalizing any merchants who does not participate. 
 As there is no value added to the merchant to participate, the system should be 
internationally funded by the overseeing government body.  The merchant must configure 
their system to connect with COMET.  There is not much overhead in cost after this is 
performed.  Furthermore, merchants must be audited bi-annually to assure the international 
working group that they are truly sending all transaction activity.  This can be performed by 
showing the company's account ledgers and matching this to the activity logged in COMET. 
6.7 Privacy Issues 
COMET is a tool which falls under privacy scrutiny from merchants who are sending 
all account activity including monetary value and gain to a third party.  Furthermore, the 
public will raise concern for allowing account information and buying trends to be sent to an 
international database.  In order to mitigate these issues of privacy, merchants and customers 
need to be aware of COMET's security and what information law enforcement is allow to 
recover and what is not recoverable. 
COMET's use is for cyberlaundering only and can only be used to obtain records that 
have been flagged by COMET as suspicious money laundering activity.  Records of activity 
that are deemed “usual” by COMET cannot be obtained by law enforcement.  Those 
responsible for training COMET's artificial intelligence component cannot take part in any 
law enforcement activities as this would be a conflict of interest.  Law enforcement can use 
records to help investigate any laundering activity.  After any investigation is completed, any 
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account information used by law enforcement external to COMET must be destroyed.   
Moreover, law enforcement may not in any fashion have financial interest in online 
merchants as the group will have confidential access to merchant activity. 
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CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION 
Money laundering is an illicit activity that has been around since the early 1900's, but 
is and has been an ongoing issue.  Due to the advent of free-trade such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), India and China's boom in commercialization 
and capitalism, and especially the creation of the World Wide Web in 1990, the world is 
becoming smaller and money laundering has now become an issue at the international level. 
Federal agencies estimate that about $300 billion is annually laundered worldwide [37].  
Understanding the stages of money laundering along with aspects or banking “zones” help 
mitigate money laundering.  Learning the techniques and tools that launderers use to clean 
illicit funds through the banking industry along with other methods has allowed law 
enforcement to mitigate and prevent money laundering.  However, money laundering 
associated with cyberbanking and other electronic currency has not been clearly understood 
and defined.  Current working groups have yet to fully decide how cyberlaundering should 
be mitigated and enforced. 
Many rules and regulations have been created in an attempt to plug holes where 
laundering at a traditional bank takes place.  Historically, money laundering has been a game 
of cat and mouse enforcement – starting with the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 that required 
banks to submit information on deposits greater than $10,000.  Launderers would skirt this 
by structuring deposits into smaller amounts or smuggling in illicit revenue, and as a result, 
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was formed to prevent these activities from 
occurring.  To further mitigate money laundering, the US Patriot Act of 2001 was created.  
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This act focused more on preventing terrorist financing, but also put stricter rules on the 
banks to combat money laundering.  Through the tools, forms, and audits, a fairly successful 
program for preventing money laundering at the brick and mortar banking level was 
developed.  However, new methods of monetary housing, distribution, and storing were and 
are developing in the cyber realm.  These methods have introduced new ways to launder 
money on an international level, and quicker than ever before. 
In order to fully understand the threat, we must know the tool that is creating the 
threat, and that is cyberbanking and cyberpayment system.  Understanding these system 
models along with the trends and developments in the cyberpayment realm can help to 
determine mitigation methods of cyberlaundering.  The systems are generally either affiliated 
with the World Wide Web or other electronic non-bank transfer systems and stored value 
cards.  Furthermore, hypothetical cyberlaundering methods were introduced in order to help 
understand methods that could be used to launder money electronically. 
Once a solid understanding of current methods for cyberlaundering were discussed 
along with other methods of illicit use in an electronic financial system then suggestions, 
concerns and possible policy was discussed to help mitigate the new methods of laundering 
money.  The cyberlaundering policy discussed in the thesis closely modeled the current anti-
money laundering regulations but included additional requirements due to the nature of 
cyberpayment systems.   
Though money laundering has traditionally been alleviated by legislation and 
compliance, using artificial intelligent systems to detect cyberlaundering can assist in 
providing additional evidence of illicit activity.  Moreover, data mining applications are the 
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only way to attempt at locating cyberlaundering as quickly as possible in order to mitigate 
the amount of illicit activity. The creation of an international tracking database system, 
COMET, that mitigates the ability for launderers to clean currency by buying and selling 
goods is one step in the future of cyberlaundering mitigation. 
Money laundering still is an ongoing issue, and with the invention of an international 
means of transferring financial currency electronically, new law enforcement from the 
international level can create policy and guidelines similar or the same as ones suggested in 
this paper to prevent this crime.  By slowing down or even stopping the means of laundering 
money electronically, many illicit activities could be thwarted and detected more easily 
making the world that we all live in safer, and more financially sound. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The following table lists the advantages and disadvantages to each of the hypothetical 
cyberlaundering methods outlined in chapter 4.  The advantages and disadvantages are from 
the perspective of the launderer considering utilizing the methods as a route for laundering 
money electronically. 
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